

Holes in the stream : three paradoxes and Hermeneulogy

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To Daniel

This collection is an assembly of texts written between October and December 2018 on anthropogenesis theory and the elaboration of Hermeneulogy.

It divides up in three main parts : *Three paradoxes*, dedicated to the presentation of the three paradoxes theory ; *The place the hands can't seek*, organising a first set of cross-disciplinary reflections (summoning mainly Hermeneutic Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, Neurobiology and Ethology) ; and then *Hermeneulogy*, getting more into the elaboration of this synthetic discipline.

Each text is very briefly described in order to structure the reading. We wished here to preserve the chronological order in which the articles were written.

I wish to thank Roland Guérin, who talked to me a long time ago about Francisco Varela's work, Marie-José Minassian, Paul Gontcharoff, Eric Maugy, Christian Corre, Frédéric Saffar and all whom supported in the long elaboration of my work.

I also wish to thank Griselda Bazan and Darian Leader for their help and support on the psychoanalytical side of it.

I thank Ellen Dissanayake for our exchange, and my friends.

And I thank my parents for everything.

Table of contents

Holes in the stream : three paradoxes and Hermeneulogy.....	1
Three paradoxes theory : Introduction.....	4
Three paradoxes.....	8
Three paradoxes - I - A short presentation of the Three paradoxes theory.....	9
Three paradoxes - II - Empirical and theoretical research.....	12
Three paradoxes - III - The birth of mediated relationship : how we commit to reality by being parted from the Real.....	17
Three paradoxes - IV - Times in therapy : attention to social and moral spaces as fields of (im)possibilities.....	21
Note on a narrative of anthropogenesis : synthesis to the three paradoxes theory.....	25
The place the hands can't seek.....	27
The place the hands can't seek : an ethical view on the Three paradoxes theory - I - The Charter.....	28
The place the hands can't seek - II. Heterogenous spaces and capacity to action.....	31
The place the hands can't seek - III - Self-destructiveness and the urban world.....	33
The place the hands can't seek - IV - The unbreakable objects and the empty hands.....	37
The place the hands can't seek - V - Inertia, metaphor, oxymoron and conceptual flexibility.....	41
The place the hands can't seek – VI – Physics, hermeneutics, language and the conditions of interpretation.....	45
The place the hands can't seek - VII - Touch, the seize-wish and relational convexity.....	49
The Einstein train : Founding Hermeneulogy.....	53
The most probable case : the hand paradox and gravity in being human.....	55
Hermeneulogy.....	58
Hermeneulogy - I - First moment : causal associative chains.....	59
Drops of sweat, drops of tears.....	60
Causality and distance.....	61
Hermeneulogy - II - From the most probable case to psychoanalysis.....	63
Hermeneulogy - III - The end of the subject.....	67
About trauma.....	68
Topology and untied points.....	69
Hermeneulogy - IV - Mind topology and structure.....	72
The three Principles of Structural Anthropogenesis.....	73
The principle of attention in a fluid environment.....	74
The Mathematics of the Mind Drive.....	75
Ethical issues.....	75
Hermeneulogy - V - The common, the complex, the imaginary object.....	77
Connector and complex object.....	77
The loss of objects.....	79
Hermeneulogy - VI - Structured constellation and the tensor.....	80
The real, the symbolic, the imaginary.....	81
The top and the base.....	82
The object c of trauma.....	83
Hermeneulogy - VII - Holes in the stream.....	85
The subject behind the word.....	85
The me paradox.....	86
Sinking in the blink.....	87
The common object in analysis.....	88
Hermeneulogy - VIII - First conclusion : the capacity to close the objects.....	90
Index : summary of the main notions.....	91

Three paradoxes theory : Introduction

[This text is a brief introduction to the theory, detached from the ensemble, that can be read separately.]

There is a beautiful idea developed by psychiatrist Ian McGilchrist in his book *The Master and his Emissary* that in the brain, the difference between left and right hemisphere would exist, but not in the current popular version of an opposition between reason and emotion. Rather more would it be a dialogue between the right hemisphere being devoted to a broad vision of reality, that is based on experiential memory - the Master -, and the left hemisphere being sent to task for a more narrow service - the Emissary.

Example taken on a bird getting to crumbs on the ground, the left hemisphere would be the part of the brain focused on the eating and its object, though the right hemisphere would be keeping an eye on a broader picture - whether some danger or friend would come out from a bush behind.

Normally, circulation and dialogue would occur continually between those two worlds of existence : the right hemisphere being the incarnate sense of reality, of implicit meaning and limitations, the left being more aware of the maintaining of a coherent internal functioning.

Yet, McGilchrist shows that for instance, people who suffered from a right hemisphere stroke would become deprived from the sense of limitation as well as from those of implicit meaning, empathy and connection to a broader reality - including spirituality, mindfulness and the Arts. Then, would only remain one more narrow sense of what is given as reality in a closer perspective - *this picture of a monkey is in fact a porcupine because it is written on the paper*.

We could also interpret the right hemisphere as being responding to the *new*, on the look out for what is coming from the periphery, and the left categorising what is already perceived as known, already set for (Elkhonon Goldberg, 2009) - further out, a difference between what is *present* and what is re-presented, present 'a second time', judged on, alien from experiential reality.

This difference between the two hemispheres would exist amongst the other animal species, according to McGilchrist. One difference made with the human species would be the development of the frontal lobe, which function is to inhibit the responses and create a distance. Obviously, we are much interested in that in our theoretical work.

This little text is designed to be an introduction to our work, that would try to formalise the main ideas, concepts and tools that we are trying to precise about anthropogenesis and the conditions of possibility for the birth of the human mind's structures.

The main idea is that we can observe three paradoxes to explain the existence and development of this capacity to create distance - to *delay or lag neural responses*, to use neurobiologist Gerald M. Edelman's terms¹ - or to *demonopolise* attention, if we borrow from philosopher Etienne Bimbenet's expression explored in his book *L'animal que je ne suis plus*.

One first paradox is a sensorimotor one (in a permissive vision of the mind as incarnate put forward by neurobiologist Francisco Varela and his concept of *enaction*) : the gazed hand. In primates' sensorimotor system, the hands are determined by their *grasping* function. They are implicitly and phylogenically defined by the objects they grasp, giving meaning to their connection to the outside world, the dialogue between the senses and the motor functions, by the fact they are

¹ In Gerald M. Edelman, *The Remembered Present : A Biological Theory of Consciousness*, 1989.

grasping or not, active or unable to act. In a short neural circuit activity, they are the mean to respond to the solicitations of their environment - as well as they pertain to its constant recreation.

But, as the pre-human species grew up as a biped species with arms long enough - not kangaroo arms - to have their hands waving in the air and grasping nothing, something odd may have occurred. If I am looking closely at my hand(s), as if it could be *one* other object I would like to grasp, can I grasp it with the very hand that uses to help me grasp for ?

In fact, no. There is a paradox, that the hand can't be *at the same time* the object I intend to go for and the *mean* to go for it. Yet it appears to me that the hand *is* a mean *for* something, and maybe it can lead me to something more.

Anyway out of this, this situation of paradox, this moment of fascination for my own hand being paradoxical because it can't be two different things - me and *not* me, the aim and the action to it. It can't be two different moments at the same time, then a delay and a lag occurs in the response I would have immediately given to the solicitation from my reality.

If I could have, I would have *immediately* grasped my hand with itself. If I could have doubled my hand, I would have created a second one to grasp it. But as I can't, I find myself blocked, temporarily, in a *no way out* situation. I have to decide whether I will stay in the fascination of my hand or get out of it and step out back to reality.

Yet I have suddenly had the sense of potential action I could derive from a short-term response to my environment up to a delayed and planned middle-term action where the *I*, the sense of the *me*, self-consciousness is involved. I have just happened to double my mind's activity and landscape of possibilities : hermeneutics is born.

That is where we connect with the second paradox, which is the paradox of the word *me* in language, involving a psychoanalytical as much as the sensorimotor view. Memory in language is always bringing an outside point of view - Jacques Lacan's third party. If I say *me* to someone, I am using a memory of a relational demonstration - I am pointing myself *out* to someone else according to the rule of demonstration. I have to get *out* of myself to show my *self* to someone else for a common understanding of what I am. The third party here is connected to the moral and social imperative to be known and predictable to the others, in order to maintain social order.

Then, when I say *me* to someone else, my attention can't be entirely in touch with the reality it aims at *at the same time* I try to involve another person into this reality. Derouting the sense of myself - the non-communicable part of the self, according to psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott's term² - because of the necessity to bring the other one into my self's reality is a symbolic paradox as well as it is a sensorimotor paradox : I can't produce the matter of the world *me*, to actually say it and be attentive to the reality it aims at at the same time. Once I say it, it is not there, it is outside of me in the world that I share with others, taken into account. I can't be the arrow and the tree in one single moment.

Synchronicity would always be a problem and a mystical issue.

The third paradox is adjacent to the others. There is a stream of conscious we maintain in our daily life because we mostly can't express our thoughts out loud in the presence of others. One major part of our work is to dig out the intimate connections between morals and violence.

According to hermeneutic philosopher Paul Ricœur, 'because there is the violence, there is the morals'³ ; however we would add that because there is the restraint of the morals, there is the

2 In the continuation of his work on *The Capacity to Be Alone*, 1958/1964.

3 In Paul Ricœur, *Écrits et conférences 2. Herméneutique*, texts assembled and annotated by Daniel Frey and Nicola

violence, which is a contained aggression. Aggression - in a large interpretation of the energy of the body toward its environment, pointed out by founding ethologist Konrad Lorenz - being part of the living and necessarily urgent to express by any mean.

The social necessity to create rules to prevent aggressive behaviour to harm others and damage collective integrity is inaugurating a symbolic social order through ritualised patterned conducts. By maintaining the conscious stream of voices in our mind, we are maintaining the memory of the others that reminds us we have to keep going on in a sound social conduct.

The bonds of moral debt created since our childhood, when we learn what objects we are able to break, to use and symbolically or physically destruct among those that we are forbidden to, those bonds are actively maintained during our life.

These inhibitions we learn to keep on ourselves through our progressive formation to the social life are creating a world of meaning and a network of possibilities (or impossibilities) to action. Hence it is deeply connected to the way manual sensorimotor mastering through technics may have created a world of meaning in our prehistory : there is a *me* because the delay has created a peculiar sense of *me* being alien - what is not alien in my empty hand, the absence of an alien substance that would have given the meaning of my grasping hand, is a mirrored self. As well, there are objects in the world that are not so different from *me* and my hand(s) because they are, in fact, quite existing in the same way.

Both my hand(s) and the objects in the world may be willing to be assimilated to an extended vision of who and what I am. My environment and my self are somehow one bit a part of the same experience where *I* create the meaning.

The third paradox is in this context the difficulty to break with the continuous flow of the stream of conscious's many voices - those *imprints*, to borrow another one of Lorenz's concepts, taken up later by psychoanalyst John Bowlby's theory of attachment. Whatever we can't do anymore in the physical world of society's rules, we have to move to imagination and its overvoicing from memory.

If we take up from the idea of the frontal lobe creating the distance necessary for the reading, for the analysing of reality, for the long-term delayed action, there is a right-hemisphere kind of attention kept awake on our surroundings. While it does, another part of attention is overvoicing it, to keep on standing up in a socially patterned and ritualised behaviour and a long-learned conduct. In the meantime, it is deriving bodily energy and personal aggression from a sheer brutal and physical expression to a creative, middle or long-term symbolical one.

It is a paradox that silence of the mind means unpredictability though we stand still and the world around us seems more free. However, morals' teaching is about the fear of hurting someone or being hurt - 'you won't do onto others what you would hate to be done onto you', the Golden Rule of morals.

The questions of power and social hierarchy came into play as our societies grew and developed since the origins from unsound foundations and mystical often fearsom visions of reality. Here, anthropological studies should give us relevant leads.

As for the method, our work is located in a crossway between disciplines from different fields, and it is as speculative as it is based on a creative, artistic and psychoanalytic experience. As musicologist John Blacking asked with his question 'How musical is man ?', revisiting the concept of entropy, and thanks to Ellen Dissanayake's work on neuroaesthetics and her concept of *artification*, we are less afraid to reappropriate our relation to natural and manufactured technological objects, to our own creativity as human beings.

Stricker, p.74, Éditions du Seuil, coll. La couleur des idées, 2010.

As well, there is the relevant question of the place of most of those daily objects according to the necessity we have to systematically occupy our hands, that has been thoroughly investigated in by psychoanalyst Darian Leader. All that in the body seems to want to *mean* something and tell it to us should be listened to with great interest and care.

We are mainly inviting here the fields of psychoanalysis, neurobiology, hermeneutics and ethology to weave a network of cooperation and solidarity to the understanding of our origins, what makes us special amongst the animal species. As we are doing that, we want to remember Varela's idea that we are not separated at a catastrophic extent from them.

Varela's proscriptive vision - contrarily to computationist and neo-darwinist's prescriptive vision of evolution - is allowing us to focus more on what makes us closer to the other species than on the differences. This way, it might allow us to discriminate evolution's turning point articulation and bring to it a conceptual key, with a keen ecological and political eye.

This key to formalise the possible conditions of possibility to the birth of the human mind is believed to be viable enough with this theory of those three paradoxes. But it is merely an opening door. We wish that further on, the next step of this investigation would involve more than one mind and more than one isolated point of view.

We have all a body-based experience, and we all live on the same planet. So we should stop letting time flow out from our hands and start taking sides for the living, against the self-destructiveness of neoliberal, power-phantasied and other aggressive, morbid and cynical ideologies ; then help recreating networks of cooperation and solidarity inside of our human societies altogether, for our one only very common and ultimate good.

Three paradoxes

Three paradoxes - I - A short presentation of the Three paradoxes theory

[This is a first immersive presentation of the three paradoxes theory.]

Let us put a goldfish in a bowl. What happens ? Not to the goldfish but to us. We look at the goldfish in the bowl. And as we look at it moving, checking that it is indeed moving and not still, that it is alive, what does happen to us ?

It might happen that we hold breath, sustain attention, find ourselves caught by something we didn't imagine before. We are simply staring at the goldfish, doing nothing – as both the goldfish and ourselves are.

The goldfish is free. Obviously it's in a bowl so it is not free to move beyond its limits ; but still it appears freer than us, or at least it makes us look a bit more odd because of it. We can't be as – apparently – careless as the goldfish. Because we know that we can't, or else we'd find ourselves be locked up in any institution that is up to prevent the actual social order from being disrupted by people thinking that they could be as careless as a goldfish. Which means doing whatever comes up to be doable, just as carelessly as walking may make us free to go on walking as carelessly as one goldfish swims.

Then hold breath, because the best part is this : during this time you did not think about what was happening in your life, by staring at the goldfish, you experienced something else : curiosity. Somewhere, you entered a vacuum room that is not allowed to exist in your daily life. You extracted yourself from the straining obligations of social behavior and allowed yourself just to be some kind of a fish.

And fish get caught. That's why we can't be a fish when living in society. We can be a fish when we are being trustful, when we are playing in some childish moments, where we forget we do have social and moral obligations that we might be working or struggling with. We even allow ourselves to be fish when we are having sex or an equivalent with a chosen partner. But those times never last, because we are reminded everyday in our lives that being a fish is dangerous. That we have to obey. And that moral domination does always prevail over us.

Now, what was this allegory for ? What if you were a monkey – for example, a chimpanzee – *at once*. It is most likely that you won't stay put in a position that wouldn't suit you. Whatever it is that is standing before you – a table perhaps – you might just climb onto it. Of course, someone may chase you out of it. You can't even be sure the table isn't actually a living being that won't slip under your feet. And maybe you'll learn to fear this particular possibility in the future, but will that haunt you to the point you will adapt your every move to it ?

The point made by the theory of the three paradoxes here is that we inspect the relationship between violence and morals, that is intimate. The french philosopher Paul Ricoeur stated in his conference on hermeneutics that « because there is the violence, there is the morals »⁴, which is related to the golden rule of the latter : « you won't do to others what you'd hate it would be done to you ». But it can turn both ways : also, because there is the morals, there is an induced violence. Because violence is not just aggression⁵ : it is contained aggression, that is at the same time

⁴ In Paul Ricoeur, *Écrits et conférences 2. Herméneutique*, texts gathered and annotated by Daniel Frey and Nicola Stricker, p.74, Éditions du Seuil, coll. La couleur des idées, 2010 (french edition).

⁵ Which has been investigated on by both psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott and founder of ethology Konrad

potentiated, always striking, and phantasmatic.

It is something that you cannot reach, that you often can't express properly. It is an urge that does indeed have an actual object, but most of the time an object that is hidden, that has necessarily been hidden by the teaching of morality. The object of the desire – in the way psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan formalised it⁶ – has been buried in language, in the codes of what signifies and what should not be signified in any other way than the one that splits from its intimate and though forbidden purpose.

The theory is then putting forward a connection between the object of psychoanalysis and the way neurobiologist Francisco Varela approached evolution in a proscriptive manner. Better than seeing evolution as an optimal adaptation of the species to arbitrary rules given by their environment – that is a prescriptive vision, similar to the vision of computationist early cognitive sciences' theories, and to the vision of morality –, Francisco Varela suggested that as long as the survival and reproduction of the species aren't threatened, those species can in fact adapt as they please or simply come to do conveniently. It is not forbidden to adapt in a non-optimal way, as long as you can manage to survive and to reproduce, for what concerns the maintaining of the species.

Founder of ethology Konrad Lorenz observed himself that many features in some of them tended to remain throughout their phylogenetic development even if these features were not of any apparent use anymore. He took the example of the horns above the eyes and on the back of the little coral fish named *Heniochus varius*, saying that it was most likely to be a disadvantage in terms of mobility, to hide itself amongst the coral. Yet it occurred that it was actually relevant as part of a ritualised confrontation which form is specific to the species.⁷ The motor disadvantage had in some way to be compensated by this behavior that made it a sustainable balance.

It appears then far more accurate to observe things in the species' own perspective, trusting that they had been finding their own way into an environment that they (re)create as well through the particular way they have to respond to it. It appears a better challenge to the curiosity of the scientist than to inflict unilateral rules that we think the species should comply to in order to fit a reality that we human observe from its tip. The living world doesn't need our consent nor regulation to exist and finds itself viable enough ways to do it.

The concept of enaction put forward by Francisco Varela shows in that way that the interaction between the individuals and their environment should form the basis of any investigation on cognition and evolution. Instead of considering that all that is not permitted by the rule of optimal adaptation is then forbidden, we should rather consider that all that is not forbidden – because threatening both the survival and reproduction of the species – is in fact permitted.⁸

Minding those ideas, there are three paradoxes we wish then to explore : first, the psychoanalytic paradox of the single word *me*, that cannot fully reach its object without facing an impossibility – once you say it, you are out of it - your attention is sent out with the word it carries to somebody else, because it's meant for the others and begging for existence - and because the sensorimotor activity is mobilised in the pronunciation of the word, sound and mental representation.

Second, the paradox of staring at one's own hand, that is a sensorimotor paradox : the hand you wish to seize, you cannot seize it with itself, though it would be your first impulse to do it.

Lorenz.

6 In Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire, livre VIII, Le transfert*, Ed. Seuil, 2001 (french edition).

7 In Konrad Lorenz, *Les fondements de l'éthologie*, Ed. Flammarion, coll. « Champs sciences », 1984, pp.50-54 (french version)

8 In F. Varela, E. Thompson & E. Rosch, *L'inscription corporelle de l'esprit*, p.264 (french edition).

And at last, the paradox of the fixity of silence : one usually fears to cut the stream of the conscious and face the silence, as the latter rely on the muting of one's effort to maintain the activity of thinking, that is signifying through the thoughts and its many composite voices. The unconscious is acting to save the subject from collapsing and from the authority of others over them.⁹

It means a new theory on anthropogenesis. While progressively standing up, pre-human species found themselves deprived from the primary motor utility of their hands they had on four legs. Uselessness implies carelessness. But one cannot stay alive if this uselessness occupies the vital limbs, the ones that start and convey most of the individual's intentions. As the face and mouth, as the snout, the primary senses, get distanced from its objects, the hands on their side remain to grant one's impulse to reach whatever stimulates their will with a yes. Yet the hands also remain of (almost) no more use now as to our ability to walk.

Moreover, they oddly make us wonder about ourselves while we see them crawl in the air, toward what we want them to get and touch and explore. So we might just as well look at it. And while we look at it, we realise that if we turn them into what we want, into the object of our curiosity, here again, they are useless – especially when focusing on one hand. Because while I'm wishing I would go to this hand - as it is at good enough distance to appear like something else, like something strange, like something *not me* - I cannot grab it with itself.

Nor can I go to it without breaking the fragile spell that lies in the distance between it and I, and that says that I will never exhaust the self, that I will never get to be the fish by putting it in a jar - that a word just like the word *me* could never reach its source in using one sound that has been meant to signify its object to someone else.

The turn of the theory is that language and human mind's structure may have leant on the birth of both violence and morality, as the strangeness of my own hand became the scene of *my self represented to myself*. While I'm presenting it, I'm representing it on a scene that is in fact *out of it*. If the hand represents me, if the word *me* represents me, it can however never *be* me, and I can never reach my self through it. To do that, I need to put language at silence, and break the stream of the conscious, as well as I need to deconstruct the chain of the signifier.

This primary frustration is intimately connected to the early and fundamental relationship between morals and violence. And any further investigation on how the human mind's structures could have taken place should take this relationship into account. It should start an investigation on the prominence of one's own inner and often hidden moral obligations - that every one of us feel and that every one has to challenge everyday, in every creative move we make.

It is the privileged reference to interpretation and signification that we grant our environment with through a system of values. The early experiences of it should be analysed in the interactions of the child with the familial and social structures – as well as in the prehistorical childhood of the human kind.

From Freud's interpretation of the Fort-Da game to Ellen Dissanayake's interest in mother-to-infant expressive interactions as well as her concept of artification in the field of neuroaesthetics, creativity – as the human mind required a great amount of creativity to emerge - should always be seen as a peculiar response to the restrictions of a deeply moral environment. Because morals is the only archetypal structure that is founding societies on arbitrary rules, due to its inner relation to language.

Here begins our investigation.

9 Read psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott's *Capacity to be alone* and Georges Devereux's *Renunciation of identity*.

Three paradoxes - II - Empirical and theoretical research

[Neurobiological inscription of the theory.]

There is an ecological urgency, that doesn't leave us much time to react. In the field of human sciences and neurosciences, it has many implications. First of them concerning our work here - that is trying to determine the turning point between animalian and human mind, trusting neurobiologist Francisco Varela's statement that there is no catastrophic gap between the two¹⁰, and specifying its conditions of possibility : what does come as proof when we are talking about the nature of the human mind and its progressive evolution ? How could we possibly probe one starting point of it ? And how to bring out a structural answer to that ?

Pertaining the method, either empirical or theoretical, we should trust the psychoanalytic discipline of self-analysis, to reach the irreducible. This must join two efforts : one leading experimentation to the outside world, another one maintaining the effort of the clarification of one's own personal limitations.

Because we trust neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp's idea that the **Tertiary Affects and Neocortical 'Awareness' Functions** [that include i) Thoughts & Planning, ii) Emotional Ruminations & Regulations, iii) 'Free Will', higher working memory functions and **Intention-to-Act** process] are the last developed and then are dependent on the primary structures of the mind.

Those tertiary affects should be taken as the tipping point of the cerebral activity and then, only an entering point to the reflection. They come after :

- 1) **Primary-Process, Basic-Primordial Affective States (Sub-Neocortical)**, that include i) Sensory Affects (exteroperceptive-sensory triggered pleasurable and unpleasurable/disgusting feelings) ; ii) Homeostatic Affects (brain-body interoceptors : hunger, thirst, etc.) ; and iii) Emotional Affects (emotion action systems – **Intentions-in-Actions**) ;
- 2) **Secondary-Process Affective Memories (Learning via Basal Ganglia)**, including i) Classical Conditioning (FEAR via basolateral & central amygdala) ; ii) Instrumental & Operant Conditioning (SEEKING via nucleus accumbens) ; and iii) Behavioural & Emotional Habits (largely unconscious – dorsal striatum).¹¹

According to Panksepp, any disruption in one of the two primary levels would have immediate effect on the upper ones, which would collapse. Therefore, in Panksepp's words : 'it is worth emphasizing that although the basic mechanisms of learning may be deeply unconscious, shifting affective feelings (i.g. Generating reinforcement effects) on which much of behavioural learning is based are not.'¹²

Which means, if we follow psychoanalyst Daniel Stern's view on *intersubjective consciousness*, that there is a mental mapping of the social environment that is structured throughout the most minimal and unspoken interactions between the individuals. Then, the

10 Making – like neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp - Darwin's dictum that the differences in the mental lives of animals 'is one of degree and not of kind' (Darwin, 1872/1988, p. 127) his own.

11 In Jaak Panksepp, Stephen Asma, Glennon Curran, Rami Gabriel & Thomas Greif, *The Philosophical Implications of Affective Neuroscience*, « A Synopsis of Affective Neuroscience – Naturalizing the Mammalian Mind », *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 2012, p. 7.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

unconscious is part of the mind as incarnate, as fledged from the body's own sensorimotor and physiological being, on every level of its activity and experience.

To quote Jaak Panksepp again : 'all mammals *experience* their emotions although most, just like newborn human infants, probably do not reflect on these *anoetic* experiences.' In our point of view, it parallels what we are looking for, that is the shifting point between "strict" animalian behavior and human structuration of the mind through language. For that, we should investigate the limit-point of language as well as its equivalent in embodied structure – as incarnate into sound.

There is a 'developmental landscape' we are looking for that constitutes a convergent point between a certain evolutionary feature – the presence of the hand in my vision - and a particularity inside the structure of language – the word *me*.

As put forward by Panksepp, 'animals turn (...) emotion-evoking brain stimulations on and off, depending on their affective valence', which means that 'whenever normal animals exhibit instinctual emotional behaviours, they probably have corresponding affective experiences'.¹³ In the contrary, human behavioural learning, via basic experiential-epigenetic mouldings, is leading to the sensitization and desensitization of particular systems. The latter happens in a social context where consciousness is intersubjective and based on social and moral - though often unconscious – rules. These rules tend to contradict and control spontaneous impulses.

In this view, psychoanalysis' work would be to disentangle how this *implicit relational knowing* - which means this form of 'procedural knowledge regarding how to do things with intimate others'¹⁴ - takes place and gets us trapped into issues often impossible to express through language. Neither can it be fully shared through the formalisation of pathological patterned behaviors as well as the attempt to signify the problem to others and to oneself *perceived as somebody else*.

It relates to what psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott described as the non-communicable part of the self¹⁵. There can be a good enough balance between this inner and hidden part of the *true self*, that is the sensory and emotional experience that often escapes language's determination, and what is communicated to others through a rule and/or language-based behavior that might be partly pathological. That leads, when the infant subject has to adapt themselves to a mother or substitute that is not *good enough*, not empathetic enough, to the artificial creation of a *false self*.

The theory of the three paradoxes entitles the paradox of the *gazed hand* with the quality of being *not good enough*. To stare at one's own hand open fixedly is a perverse-orientated behavior. And our aim here is to specify this point in the learning of being human that is archetypical enough to connect to another paradoxal situation that we find in the structure of language. That is the paradox of the word *me* and the incapacity it has to *really* reach its object or more precisely, the incapacity to lead the subject into reaching the *me* reality through and thanks to language.

All impossibilities found in these two paradoxes are violent : the incapacity of the hand to reach itself - or to lead itself as far as to grant the intention and neural impulse with a success in achieving the paradox - though it is the first use of the hand to reach and seize ; and the incapacity of the word *me* to represent a coherent image of what it aims at.

The point where morals' learning meets the violence and frustration, due to the restriction of an unachievable aggression, is the point where we might grasp a glimpse of what is so specific in the human mind's structure. It pushes forward the inner call for fantasy to be the mental relay of the impossible action, so to be the birth of a seek for an escape, a way out of this absolute dead end.

I can learn to use my hands knowing that I could never beg them for help to resolve the

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁴ In Karlen Lyons-Ruth & the Process of Change Study Group of Boston, Massachusetts, « Implicit Relational Knowing : its rôle in development and psychoanalytic treatment », *Infant Mental Health Journal*, Vol. 19(3), 1998, p. 282.

¹⁵ In the continuation of his work on *The Capacity to Be Alone*, 1958/1964.

impulse to an endless seeking. I have to learn to redo things, to recycle energy, to manage entropy, to build brick by brick and step by step, word by word, idea by idea, thought by thought and emotion to emotions that are hardly cohabitating easily.

In the ontogenic process of the development of the human being, it takes place notably in the early infant's personal learning of *how to behave in an environment of objects* and of *which ones I am allowed to break*. In the phylogenic development of the human species, it locates in the doubling of the basic consciousness in the creation of *another self*. Both are related to a certain way to deal with the violent impossibility of being *at the same time* the me that sees and the *me* that is seen.

Because when I say 'me', I am already somebody else.

One other indicator we lean on is neurobiologist Gerald M. Edelman's statement that in order to 'be conscious to be conscious', the brain's neural network should have developed the capacity to delay or lag neural responses.¹⁶ This postulate connects to that Panksepp's proposal that 'the neocortex [where are located the Tertiary-process cognitions] was not modularized by evolution but rather becomes specialized for diverse cognitive activities through developmental landscapes.'¹⁷

Then, as we may reasonably consider that an evolutionary feature won't appear from nowhere and for no reason, we would have to look for a concrete biological situation that might be able to push the *anoetic* consciousness to delay the neural responses and double its developmental landscape.

What we are looking for, we find it in the paradox of *staring at my own hand*, which is artificial and therefore valid as a limit-point. It is artificial because one cannot sustain the effort of being at the limit between the impulse to do the thing – to seize the hand – and the impossibility to do it. The effort will be necessarily released at one moment.

It is then a paradox that blocks what Panksepp called the first of the seven primary-process emotional networks (concentrated in subcortical regions of the brain), that is 'the intrinsic enthusiasm of the SEEKING system', that in fact drives every other impulse – amongst RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, GRIEF and PLAY.

As well, being part of an *implicit relational knowing*, because it is impossible to communicate by words, this paradox should have been forming a force of channelling to the mind, that would '[continue] to operate implicitly throughout life'.¹⁸ The capacity to concentrate on technics, that is not dependent on what I can do but on what I in fact *cannot do yet*, requires a doubled mind. Because one has to learn first that the impossible belongs to them. The impossible *is* them.

Then, this paradox will continue to operate but silently, through the learning of a controlled attention on my movements, what their consequences are, what they provoke amongst my siblings, what I can provoke through them.

The wonder continues to affect my perception and my experience of my social world 'outside attention and conscious experience, without benefit of translation into language'. And it happens so because violence necessarily does. Violence is a concentration of the energy that appears impossible to express without harming anyone. Violence is necessarily repressed or then leading to odious acts if it can't be turned to create a common good instead.

That's why violence and morals are deeply connected and intricate, because the morals is an ambiguous creative act that leads to myth : to the long path one takes to build themselves a way of living that can be good in spite of what the moral order forbids them to do. It can imply to create

16 In Gerald M. Edelman, *The Remembered Present : A Biological Theory of Consciousness*, 1989.

17 In Jaak Panksepp, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

18 In Karlen Lyons-Ruth & the Process of Change Study Group of Boston, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

art. It can imply to try to exist in any way that is both not told to be and yet not forbidden at the moment.

To remain still and quiet, fitting oneself into a patterned behavior that is rule-based and procedural, is something alien to other animalian kinds the way it emerged in our species. In fact here, the presence of others is systematically anticipated and calculated, adapted to. This is deeply connected to the way the hand is seen in the vision. It can't only be a question of how we learn to be social, to interact with our siblings, but a question of how we integrate them in our perception of who and what we are, of the *I* that is complex, still ambiguous and impossible to achieve permanently.

The action of seizure we mean here is both representing the seizure of objects by the hand and the hand itself mentally seized by the conscious accompanying every move it can make.

Also important, the hand I see is an object like any other object in the world of my vision. As well as with them, I interact with my hand and then, I'm part of an ongoing mutually constructed regulation with it, which interactive field becomes more complex and well-articulated with the development of technics.

This way, if we continue to borrow from the *implicit relational knowing*, there is a 'moment of meeting' (term formalised by psychologist Edward Tronick, 1989), which is paradoxal because it blurs the distinction as to my hand being or not a part of me.¹⁹

If I choose to consider that this hand can imaginarily not be mine but something *I* play with, I make a distinction between this *I* and the self. The *I* in play is not the self behind. Because I expect my hand to follow a certain pattern and not otherwise to begin with. Then, to use the *implicit relational knowing's* terms, 'expectations regarding each partner's moves in (...) game are established, the stage is set for both partners to 'play with' that form by violating established expectations. This mutual sense of the emerging possibility of new forms of interaction occurring between the two participants creates heightened affect.'²⁰

Of course here, being playing with the sense of my own hand, which I control in fact, I know *exactly* what the other one is 'thinking'. But as I know my hand won't move if I don't tell it to – knowing that it will only if *I* do -, I reflect on the capacity of telling something that does nothing, that is inert, to *do*. The attention given on my hand is a *waiting* : it won't happen anything except for my deciding so. And it is paradoxal because my attention on the thing is waiting for it to *do something*, as if it would actually do something independent from my intentions. Except that it doesn't, because *it* also *is* waiting for me – and I am waiting for it – and that is the paradox.

But in that paradox and in its confusion of who is whom and which is which, occurs a delay. A sensorimotor and neural delay. The gap of thinking. The blank space to be written within. The room suddenly made for the self to come into interaction with the *I* that is a social construction. New initiatives can be made, because it is only permanently waiting for me and never satisfied – in fact waiting for *I* to decide what to do with this delayed action – this potentiated action. And the energy concentrated in this waiting can turn violent, because it is undecided – *knowing* that it *has* to decide – and thus endangering my being safe in decision and realisation.

The quality of the personal decision is something *had*, something seized – not the hand seizing objects in the world – but the mind seizing the decision that through the hand will seize the objects in the world.

The chain of the signifier has been created, as well as the objects of the world *as objects* that

¹⁹ See also examples provided by psychoanalyst Darian Leader of some psychological pathologies, in his beautiful book *Hands*, 2016.

²⁰ In K. Lyons-Ruth et al., *op. cit.*, p. 286.

are not me. Distinction that has been made between my hand and *I*.

Movement of the hand, of one's own hand in their vision, is the following step to receiving the hand and the self as something that I can't tame and exhaust, that I can't annihilate nor destruct without destructing a part of me, and therefore that I will have to deal with it and cooperate.

The sensorimotor interaction between the individual and their environment implies that every move made and sensed in a continuous flow is being cognitively intergrated to their experience and neural network. So, this is the case for all mammals. But what makes humans' case different is that they have to deal with hands that are like another person, detached enough from the body to appear *like something else*. This is possible because they became biped and because the hands have been progressively separated from the motor functions.

Then, there must have been a sensation of wavering, because the whole balance of the body has been changed. Paleontologist Yves Coppens uses to state in his conferences that the pelvis became structurally important as a support of the weight of the top of the body. Verticality needs a balance or it's dizzy.

To cope the dizziness, catch your own breath.

Three paradoxes - III - The birth of mediated relationship : how we commit to reality by being parted from the Real

[First insight on the relation-to-object structure.]

The farthest we could get to the heart of human consciousness isn't yet – hopefully - out of reach. It is only a matter of asking the right question. How do we create, as an animal species, not only a system of difference in language, but a peculiar system of mediation in our relationship to objects ?

We would like here to bring out a new brick in the 'relationship to object' 's wall. Whether it is a symbolic object in the way Jacques Lacan formulated it, the object of desire, or a real object, or even something in between, transitional in Donald Winnicott's way, we would add here another feature : how the dimension the lacanian object has of being 'not had', hidden, lacking, endlessly out of reach, may have been created at its birth through the experience and some consciousness of impossibility.

That any animal individual may turn unable to reach what it aims at, it then happens that it cannot do it, and that's it : it can't. Maybe it will try again several more times, maybe it will feel disorientated : but what does make human beings state that then it is impossible, that it is out of reach, left to dream of ?

Impossibility may in fact have been provided through a long time ago in our prehistory by the hands and the way it got more and more separated from the motor functions. It's impossible because there is a disruption between the object that is real and the object that I need, that I feel an urge to acquire. Take a child for instance, as one is eating something that will then vanish because absorbed, which existence depends entirely on them and the instance providing them with it, it still happens that it is not quite the same thing as the attempt on eating their own hand. This will not disappear : it will survive.

Then, tension is about holding, and releasing appears more difficult to achieve, because it means to recognize the vanity of the attempt to exhaust what one wants. Relationship to the object of my desire is all about holding the mediation to this object, and being or not afraid of losing it, of its disappearance. As psychoanalyst Darian Leader so precisely pointed out in his book *Hands*²¹, it is more about maintaining the stimulation of our hands - that continually need to grasp and tickle - whatever means it takes, than anything else, often including moral issues.

Because hands bring everything else to the rest of the body, including our thoughts. The hands are our primary mediation to objects. But, hands cannot reach themselves or more precisely, one hand cannot be the object of desire and the agent of this desire, so this is a paradox we discussed earlier. This paradox generates a tension, and this tension becomes the agent of phantasy. Because to be able to feel something like an unexpected tension may appear sometimes greater to the subject than the fulfilment of their desire. It turns the subject into a moral subject.

The tension in the relationship to objects is weaving the framework of violence. It is violent because the aggression of the subject cannot be expressed by the means of the action to this object one cannot reach out. They become impotent, but it is not their fault, because it is simply impossible to reach this object. And it is impossible because I know that I am a person that feels.

I isolate myself from the necessity to reach by asking myself how odd it is to get satisfied by the feeling of stating : something is impossible. Something is magical because it is an impossible

²¹ Most of the books referred to are mentioned in the previous parts of this essay.

thing. It cannot happen, yet it happened to me that I saw the opportunity to reach that slipped away because it was simply too big for me. Here, there, outside of me, there is an excess that is not me though referred to me and to my feeling it.

This situation becomes a play which needs players. Myself, my hand and I are playing for the world to see. This is exactly the kind of process described by the Third Party in the mirror phase in the creation of one's ego, reflected on by Jacques Lacan since his early work. Someone must be looking at and for me whom I'm playing these representations of my ideal self for. Except that we are reflecting on this through the perspective of early humans. A proper mirror effect of imitation could have taken place in these prehistoric societies, as Ellen Dissanayake proposed in her work on neuroaesthetics, notably in the mother-infant relationship and their dialogue through the shifts of facial expressions.

But to fully grasp the birth place of such circumstances, we would first have to loosen up the web of what is pre-conceived and pre-manufactured in our current and contemporary societies. Again, as Darian Leader suggested, our relationship to daily objects for example has shaped our environment and our perspectives. What is possible and what is not have been woven in conditions that lean on the early creation of our relationship to our daily objects. This relationship is based on a very simple rule : there are objects one can handle and even destroy as they wish, and others that they should not handle and even less destroy.

It makes sense to most people when they tell a child not to touch that fancy vase, or that pen that belongs to the grand-father's desk. What Darian Leader's approach to technology is highlighting at this point, is that we've come to be so much accustomed to be living with and surrounded by objects that give us what we want them to and that have been designed to do so, that we forgot completely how much a natural environment could be unpredictable.

Pathologies emerge at this point where we cannot expect anything more from our daily objects that, eventually, cannot give us anything but a reflection of ourselves. The mirroring effect of objects, whether they are simple daily objects, high-technology objects or social objects, such as social and moral values, or even phantasies, 'pure' objects of desire, is located in their genealogical aspect. These objects pertain to the writing of the cultural web and its tightening. The closest we are to these objects, the closest we get to the culture and to the social community we want to belong to or are trained and appealed to do so.

Hence the more our behaviour is predictable, readable from this social and cultural perspective, the more we keep the appropriate cultural narrative tight, and the more we think that its web, its network of moral values we learnt as children is stable and still valid.

The creation of the object in the child's mind, as described by Donald Winnicott, is central to the extent it sets the importance of how they are personal to us, intimate. We expect from these objects to tell us something about the world we are living in, the reality, and to guarantee its validity. However, when one is looking carefully at a tree, at how tall or how little it is, there is no guarantee the tree would have expected to confront itself to me. On the contrary, its growing has nothing to do with pleasing or easing me. It is one fact I cannot exhaust, except for my trying to destroy the reality that it represents, if not itself.

The resistance of the subject to give up what is necessary to maintain one symbolic setting amongst objects that are connected to a primitive moral order ('Don't touch that') is significative. It tells us very much about one's necessity to make these lively connections to this particular setting, which has been validated by figures of a moral authority that are intimate to the person, something that prevails over any stranger point of view that would be external to this network of signification. Once the subject has been tightly binding themselves to this network of signification that put them

at the centre of the world, reality depends on it, and from the outside part of their world, it gets difficult for anyone else not to be absorbed in this logic and at the same time, not to be judging their attempt of self-cure in some pathological cases.

It has been pointed out by analysts such as Winnicott, Georges Devereux (notably in *Renunciation of identity*) and Darian Leader as well when talking about psychosis. And it gets echoes to Ellen Dissanayake's interpretation of what the Arts could have meant since the beginning of their manifestation : in her words, an *artification* of the early humans' environment. To mark a stone with painting, with a colouring substance, is not that of a language yet as much as it is a way to make the stone belong to the individual's inner world. 'It belongs to us *now*.' And the *now* is very important because it is the print of a conscious choice made over a certain perception of reality.

We could as well find inspiration in philosopher (however controversial) Mircea Eliade's work featured in *The Sacred and the Profane*. The shapeless wild environment surrounding the early humans should have been organised through the marking of objects in the world that were thus invested of something more than the rest, *saturated* of people's minding it, given an importance that was exceeding their practical value : made Sacred. This 'sacred' quality is something that can never be reached nor had, but only referred to and desired.

The fact that I have or do not have the object I'm seizing with my mind to get it into my imaginary world, is quite striking. And the workings of imagery is deeply connected to how we perceive our hands : hands have a clear shape, articulated, plural. It is me and it is *not me* because in my vision and through the sensorimotor interactions between motor functions and sensory perceptions, it is *only* responding to me. I cannot adress a wish to them and question them at the same time. Whether I'm using them or am I feeling myself in possession of such a power to use them : knowing you have a power is sometimes more striking than using it, because it is up to you to decide whether to use it or not.

Then there is a marking of the mind on my hands. And there is a consciousness of my body because I can stop myself from moving while watching myself having hands at the end of my arms. Hands are both separated from and joined to me by my arms and by one mental link. I have them, but when they act, they belong to their action – and to the objects they're acting toward. They're identified with the intention they carry.

It is a difficult choice to decide whether my hands belong to me or to their actions, to their *doing things* that are useful, but not quite as powerful as observing me holding them. Then even myself becomes stranger, because who am I ? Am I located in the intention I provide my hands with to do things, or is my identity below that, before, somewhere hidden, inside my feeling of myself ? And then what is the world ? Is the world equal to my incapacity to be one myself with my action ? And then, the world becomes something indeed separated from my interaction with it.

I become one seperated from the world, and the world keeps on getting stranger too.

From there, we can imagine that the early subjects, in that very wild and loose world of a language-based society yet to be constituted and structured, had first to deal both with a natural environment and the progressive constitution of an environment of handcraft objects. And at this point, we have to imagine how groundbreaking it could have been to isolate objects from the world that are steady objects. They are steady not because they don't move, but because they don't move *within* our not moving either. We invest them with our capacity to stop, to *delay or lag* our responses to the stimulations of the outside world – to use again neurobiologist Gerald Edelman's formulation.

We can then more and more commit to a world that we choose to commit to because we have been parted from its symbiotic unity. The symbiotic unity of the living is based on the

sensorimotor principle : I interact constantly with my environment, that is as well created, perceived through the possibilities offered by my biological constitution.

As we discussed it earlier, we join neurobiologist Francisco Varela's proscriptive approach to animalian behavior and evolution as well as to cognitive sciences when say that the individuals of a species are free to act as they will, as long as it doesn't endanger their survival and reproduction. If they happen to find another way to be, to live and behave than a supposedly optimal standard, nothing prevents them from doing so.

Hence, human societies emerged with the possibility to grant common objects with the privilege of being representations of themselves, of people's capacity to reflect on themselves as *being able to make some conscious choices*. This is this capacity to part ourselves from the imperative of responding to our direct environment that allows us to build something else such as an environment made out of handcraft – and later machine-craft – objects, made and meant for us.

It is important that we don't forget to look upon this capacity in a way that enables us to open a dialogue between how we react to our current mixed environment and how we respond to constant sollicitations from the symbolic environment of our cultural network.

For that, we should adress the inner participation to the stream of conscious, the continuous flow of thoughts and voices that shape our mental world and gives room to the imaginary representation of our thoughts and feelings. These voices often aren't our own. The phenomenon of impression we find in the actual stream of conscious reveals the attachment we have to make our inner world relevent to us. The people whose voice tend to embody our thoughts are figures of a certain authority. We give them authority to express our thoughts and states of mind through their particular way of being publicly represented in the symbolic order of the world.

There is a *mimesis* effect that is proper to include different aspects of reality into our own personal narrative. As philosopher Paul Ricœur pointed out²², narration is both a matter of intrigue and of the plurality and richness of its rhythm. There is a strong print of stylistic impressions that we borrow from here and there to make our own tapestry of a story which we hope is our story. It should tell something about us and more importantly, that allows us to be in a state of expressing ourselves.

Staying a lively being, whose structure is active, alive and not dead, can take many forms, including nourishing a delusional form of reality that might be a way, eventually, to stay alive. It is so to that extend that we keep creating a distance between the world of what is Real - that would have our nose directly plunged into seeking food and solace - and what is symbolic, guaranteed by the community and by the tightening of the cultural network.

To understand that the closest we are to the others - with less and less regard to what Darian Leader calls a 'livable distance' -, whether it is on the physical level or on the symbolic level, the hardest it gets to part from this relational symbolic unity we tend to bind ourselves to. On that level, the unconscious bonds are the more resistant to their untying and also the more resilient as to their capacity to adapt the interpretation we have on meanings to their own purpose.

We wished here to lay a path to an anthropogenealogical approach of analysis, analysis of individuals as well as of cultural, philosophical and scientific issues. We believe it to be useful as long as we can keep in mind that we can't live in a world only made of mirrors.

22 In his book Temps et récit I.

Three paradoxes - IV - Times in therapy : attention to social and moral spaces as fields of (im)possibilities

[On the importance of heterogenous spaces in analysis.]

We would like now to adress another issue that was merely implied in our earlier work. We talked then about the moral laws and how our learning them drives us to adapt to our social environment. The latter is based on a network of significations. It is rule-based and it is effective on every level of the constitution of our identity as human beings.

In his book about psychosis *What is madness ?*, psychoanalyst Darian Leader evokes anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss' assumption that language induces a system of division and contrast, of difference, that shapes humans' experience. Yet it also then 'impoverishes' our empirical reality.

This happens 'in the sense that the reality was broken down into units and sets of units that could be conceived as distinct'.²³ Instead of a continuous flow of experience, we evolve through a perception of time and space that is marked. We are surrounded by objects that are symbolically charged.

It supposes that this symbolic order introduces a negativity in our experience of reality, a distance from its supposed immediacy. Then, 'entering the symbolic means accepting the rules and conventions of society, together with the prohibitions and limits necessary for it to function, which will have effects on the body itself'.

If Sigmund Freud himself referred to libido as the sexual energy of the body when adresssing these prohibitions, we are much more interested here in the connections it could share with the paradox of our theoretical research. That is the paradox of the impossible identification to the hands that are both myself and the objet I intend to act toward at the same time.

Introducing Jacques Lacan's work on the 'imaginary identification' with the infant's own body, Darian Leader reminds us of the idea that the unity of this image had first to be found outside themselves. It is perceived through the body of another person, should it be another child's or their own reflection in a mirror.

In fact, according to psychologist James Baldwin's statement, 'the constitution of the human ego is simultaneously the constitution of the alter ego. We are both lost and found in the mirror image. [...] Identifying with the image promises to unify us, yet never entirely delivers, as the very thing that gives us unity takes it away.'²⁴

The risk of being stuck in the duality of the mirror image is to annul and autodestruct both parties. That is why Jacques Lacan introduced the idea of a Third Party, which generally is the mother's eye. The fascination of me seeing myself in the mirror is counterbalanced by a meaning given to the existence of my body by this third party. For example, my mother saying that I have 'my grand-father's eyes'. It relates the fragmented elements of my body to a symbolic network formed by my family and social environment.

The fascination for the image is moved onto this connection to the others. Then I learn to make my body's existence and behaviour acceptable to them and to the moral rules they pertain to.

The connection we make with our theory here is that one paradox like the impossibility of being the hand I see and the hand that *does* at the same time lead the subject to consider another

²³ In Darian Leader, *What is madness ?*, Penguin Edition, 2011, p. 51 (Kindle Edition)

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46

object : the hand that acts. In the sense that it opened a scene to action, into spaces that became dependent on *what I can do*. The imaginary action, phantasised, then comes to precede the feasible action and its achievement.

Hence, if anything happens to appear impossible for me to do because I'm prevented from doing it by an external force, what happens to those spaces ? How does the authority of something or someone else than me have an impact on me and on my doing ? And how space as well as the possibility of my action inside it are marked by the trauma of this impact ?

The issue we would like to tackle here is that then space is not neutral. There are several spaces that are interconnected because they share a common cultural affiliation. But they imply different possibilities and laws that rule what is acceptable as a behavior for the individual in society. Altogether, they give form to a general personal landscape that is shaped by the acceptance of what is possible or impossible for me to do in each of these social spaces.

I won't be likely to behave the same way at home with my family, than at work or in the street toward people who are not intimate to me. To an extreme extent in most cases of psychosis for example, those intimate to me may not even be aware of the obsessive ideas that are prominent in my life. In the case of quiet psychosis, their delusional system of thinking doesn't always impair the person's ability to maintain stability in everyday life, and often goes unnoticed.

Yet in the cases of psychosis, it seems that this mental landscape we were talking about had narrowed itself down. It came to the point that to the person every one of these spaces tend to respond to the same general rule : that it might be a source of aggression toward them. Then the person has to prevent this narrowing symbolic environment to shrink onto them and absorb them.

The capacity to introduce a distance between them and this image of themselves hasn't proved strong enough to stop the confusion between the two, assimilating the world to their phantasy at the same time. However by doing so, it still happens that they try to give meaning to this delusional relationship to their environment.

We won't enter further here into the question of psychosis in itself, for which we refer to Darian Leader's work you would find more details of in his book. But we would like to linger on the connection between those spaces we talked about and the time of therapy, as well as the times *in* therapy.

If those spaces are marked with traumas, whatever are their force, they may act like blockers, black spots on this landscape of possibilities the individual might be able to work with. There are times in therapy as well as there are most of those spaces to absorb and eventually, to let go of if they don't prove sound to the person. Those spaces and their social constitution may happen to be a source of violence, that is always connected to an impossibility to express what needs to be free to express.

To be on a crowded underground train, even if people around you are not likely to attack, may remind you how much you feel uncomfortable with intimacy and the possibility of being touched by somebody else. At the same time, your capacity to fully engage in life and to take decisions toward other people may be impaired by the fear of authority. And the latter may take its source in your anguishing over a split in the relationship with your father if you ever come to confront him with a divergent opinion.

Then, fear is symbolic and locates in the small details. Your whole environment is penetrated with, for example, this interpretation that to get to be touched by someone on your body is going to cause damage to your relationship with your father. Because you're afraid of being parted from the

source of authority he represents, and because being touched by someone else would be a divergent opinion of him not being the center of your moral world.

This is an example to say that social spaces are penetrated by the same fears that prevent the individual from having a better relationship with their reality. Those spaces are not neutral. Most of them are even not that sane and most of them are inherently violent because our societies are violent. The capacity to create spaces that are sanctuaries to the person, that allow them to be safe, secured, and then to extend the circles of these spaces may be capital to therapy.

And that is why there are times in therapy, because each space of one's personal landscape of possibilities, of secure being, of liberty that is a moral and mutual liberty with the others in these spaces, has to be confronted to in the first place.

A trauma may be easier to confront then in time when these spaces stop being invaded by the delusional ideas it generates. But then again, it is a reciprocal process, an in-and-out dynamics that implicates the moral debts formed between the person and their surrounding.

Violence strangulates us where we are most vulnerable. In accord with Darian Leader's idea (also expressed in their time by psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott and ethnopsychanalyst George Devereux), one should respect the attempt of the person to protect this never communicated space they hold within, and to encourage its safe release later on.

Note on a narrative of anthropogenesis : synthesis to the three paradoxes theory

[First conclusions and synthesis.]

There are two hearts to the theory of the three paradoxes : one that is sensorimotor, the other one symbolic. The sensorimotor heart of the theory is that as the hands are the primary vector of intention toward outside objects, one's hand(s) cannot be the object of intention itself and their own vector to grasp it at the same time. I cannot seek to grasp my hand with itself while I desire to do it.

The symbolic heart of the theory is that the hand(s), representing the self in the world of action - notably in my vision -, become an object of desire and a mean to analogical assimilation of the other objects in the world. It becomes a referential experience of my self being an object of consideration that is impossible to assimilate, to minimise ; then I may try to assimilate some other things that, in fact, I can't assimilate either.

I can't assimilate my hands within myself (unlike the food I grasp in order to eat it, for example), to destroy them into myself, but that is alright because maybe if I can't assimilate my hands, I can assimilate this tree over there – that I can't – but maybe the tree is just like my hand. It is something I can cohabitate and be intimate with. Maybe I can keep this, or something smaller, like a rock, close to me so it can lower the insecurity from not having resolved the problem of my hand(s) in the first place.

That is never ending - the chain of the signifier -, but fortunately enough, the fact that I have to live in society with others may keep me from going mad too soon – unless I am expelled from this society. So which of my actions would be more likely to convince the others that creating new problems is better than to stick with the old ones – like finding food, as a first choice example ? Most likely, power. Something visible enough to acknowledge that it has an immediate effect on their surroundings.

Hunting skills through tools are one example. But why not music or painting ? Why not blowing in a piece of bone, or leaving a coloured mark on a rock ? How can aggression be tempered by the discovery that with two pre-existing things – myself and an outside object – can appear an unprecedented event that might reshape the world of possibilities.

It is a violent event, but only as one birth is violent : it is new and has to be made comfortable to live with afterwards.

But as well, if I want to designate myself to one another, I'd show myself with my hand on my chest : 'that is *me*'. Yet in the mean time, what I may feel like is : 'do the other one *understand* that this is me ?' I can't communicate my-self without communicating it to *another one*. And thus, I can't exist in the world of objects that I show without pointing my-self out to somebody else.

By doing so, my hand hitting my chest mediates this *something else* that shows that I will exist to the other : a sign. A sign to be looked at as well as an outside object that can be shared. A new reality in the world of what can be recognised as *what I can show you* in one object's place. 'You would understand *me* from my gesture of pointing my chest out.'

But as to the question of *who did this?* that I have to answer to, I would show that, for example, *I made that sound*, and show you how to do it, or simply do it again later. Yet as I turn to objects in the world that in any way I create, instead of killing time, I am only trying *myself* by doing *that*. The *that*, maybe, is going to give me an answer as to my *self* that does. Because it is a

me that does, right ?

From then I populate my world with things that don't exist - or not yet, or not in this form. Signs are forming a new world for me to be living in. And I start looking at the stars in a slightly different way.

One should always remember that the first humans should have been poets, like children are the birth of poetry. Things that seem futile to us today should have looked very important to them and highly fascinating. We should share their fascination for these little things, because if we let them be lively, our world will be livelier too.

Our hands are so familiar to us now that we forgot how much they were extraordinary at the time. Our call here is that we never forget that we too came from a somewhere that was of little importance to the universe, but hardly a little expectation to us. And the world, then, becomes bigger.

Yet the key to understand this - is a small key.

The place the hands can't seek

The place the hands can't seek : an ethical view on the Three paradoxes theory - I - The Charter

[On the importance of a strict ethical setting in the extensions and use of the theory.]

We would like to summon here all that in the structure of thinking is sometimes leading us to choose between alternatives. We can either go with the flow of one society's time, regardless of where it is heading at, or take a step backward and try to think of its direction - and then try to determine whether we should follow it or not.

As to the ecological matter and the impact of neoliberalism on our ecosystems, the response is no, we shouldn't follow the general statement that we will prevail over any other kind of living. Our economical and (geo)political system is ill, and we ought to drive our generations to another path.

In an article for the *Monde Diplomatique*, french sociologist Pierre Bourdieu wrote in march 1998²⁵ that the strategy of neoliberal ideology was to erase all the collective structures between the corporations and the capital. First of these structures were the States. Then went the Unions and the individuals working.

Violence is a shock²⁶, because in violence you realise that the mean to destruction is a straight line. Aggression can be managed. It can be dodged and danced around. Violence is a mean to be direct on the object of destructive impulse - and it is measured through the harsh restraint of the moral laws.

Violence is an absolute. It is so because as we saw it, it is born from a paradoxal situation : I want to destroy, I want to assimilate, to eat, to love, but I can't. And I first can't because I know that there are things that I can't assimilate without damaging myself.

First of them all, my own hands, that even if seen as outside objects in my vision, cannot be assimilated as one of them without denying my *self*. There is a sensorimotor paradox, the fact that my hands cannot be at the same time the object of my fascination and the mean to catch themselves - not one by the other, but *themselves* by themselves, individually. And there is a symbolic paradox : as soon as I try to express identity and unity, the concept of the *me*, I have to get out of my *self* to communicate it through some sign - then, language.

This is the fundamental idea, the core of the three paradoxes theory, as to which I invite you to the corpus of articles preceeding.

But first, before entering the ideas of the theory for themselves, we would like to adress a particular question when talking about this matter. What is the ethical point of raising a theory on the probable conditions of possibility and birth of the human mind ?

What if we did actually raise a valid conception of how it could have taken place in the early times of our evolution ? What if, from the sensorimotor *enacted* - derived from neurobiologist Francisco Varela's *enaction* concept - behaviour of the other species, to the morally restrained behavioural structure of the human species, we found a soft and progressive theoretical key to understand their crucial differences ?

What to do with it ?

The program is vast, and the consequences large. It could not only impact the field of

²⁵ In <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1998/03/BOURDIEU/3609>

²⁶ And we can think of journalist Naomi Klein's *The Shock Doctrine* to remind us how it is accurate in our societies.

science, for it is a question that has been tackled since the beginnings of our time. Then, if someone came to you and told you : "I have the key to understand this", what would you do with it ?

First, it is to hope that you would intent to find your own reason out of it. Secondly, it is also to hope that you would try to reason our societies' self-destructive behaviour. Because what a theory such as the one proposed here is stating, is that it is all indeed in our hands.

Yet, we do know how ill our societies are, because it has been forged on unsound foundations. Violence is a direct line, and people holding power by force are the most aggressive. Then to come to a position of power, we are taught to be as aggressive, if not even more aggressive than them. It is not a race for survival, it is competition for the ecstasy of 'jouissance' - the lacanian 'plus-de-jouir'.

Because the 'jouissance' is the holding of the object of desire, of phantasy, without the capacity to release them.²⁷ The violence of it is a direct line too : I have to hold and I can't get to it anyway - because the holding is in itself the object of desire. The power to desire is in itself the object of desire. I have to desire to feel that *I* desire - again, a paradox, because it is meant not to get me anywhere anyway - except for the absolute it aims at : a self-destructive cycle of absorption.

We would like then here to establish a charter. A charter to guarantee that looking at the object of the theory - the mechanisms of the birth of the human mind - we would be entitled with a moral and ethical responsibility : not to use it for the worst.

We therefore establish a charter in several points :

1) The mention of violence as a structural feature of the theory of the Three Paradoxes is not a validation of violence. It is more a prototypical structure than an archetypical one. That violence, in its relation to morals, could have been at the origin of the formation of thinking doesn't mean that its end should be a violent one. Any birth is violent, because it creates the new, but not every born has to be a violent one.

2) Analysing the relation to the hand - as to the paradox of the gazed hand - should not lead to experimentations to an end of enhancing or breaking individuals' abilities. We oppose any attempt to use a theory meant to understand our private nature, as a species, with any intention to dominate or control our siblings. On the contrary, we wish it could help bringing fluidity to anyone's own relationship with their identity, as we belong to a same kind, living on the same one planet.

3) We wish that these ideas could lead to better cooperation between the individuals, given that we are all responsible to the way we enshrine our existence in our own cultural narrative. We wish to highlight the necessity to read cultural as well as individual differences as something that is indigenous and idiosyncratic, regardless of the economical and financial globalisation's attempt to bring uniformity and predicatability to all territories. We believe in heterogenous spaces and indigenous identities inside a shared heritage as a species on a shared biosphere.

4) These theoretical researches and ideas should help create more egalitarian societies and encourage the reinforcement of counter-powers to the dominant and self-destructive current neoliberal model. It is not time anymore to grant this model with the benefit of the doubt. It is highly harmful and should be up to its end. Bringing an idea about paradoxes and violence in humans' behavioural structure is not only a scientific act, it is a political act. We act to take side for reason, not a fashionable illusion for an unsustainable and inequitable order.

5) And at last, according oneself to these ideas should lead to favor a more harmonious relation to our natural environments and ecosystems in their specificities and diversity, as well as

²⁷ We invite you here to read the accurate analysis on this point proposed by psychoanalyst Darian Leader in his book *Hands*.

we wish to favor a greater respect to the diverse forms of living among all the species having been able to develop on Earth. Reason should lead us to limit any destructive initiative that would break the balance of an equitable living to all. It is now that we have to guarantee that. That means rethinking the urban world. That means thinking local and cooperative. That means that we don't have to live under pressure, because violence is one thing that *we* invented. Violence is ours, and we can and should decide that it is not a fatality.

We are not talking here of utopia, because the aim of our theoretical ensemble is to prove that there is no mystical explanation to our being here that hasn't been a deeper part of us.

This is the first page of a say that would try to explain you why.

The place the hands can't seek - II. Heterogenous spaces and capacity to action

[On the intrication between heterogenous spaces and perception of reality as a support to action.]

The mind is a network. It is formed to a great extent through learning, experimenting, connecting experiences and reinforcing them. To know what to do with our body in our environment includes at least three levels of these learning, experimenting, connecting and reinforcement.

Those²⁸ are : the physical environment which I learn the reality of my body from ; the physiological changes in my body, including the images and sounds coming to my head ; and the moral contracts I make with the other people belonging to the same place.

These three interlocked, nested and intricate spaces are interdependent and codependent. We are always engaging the three of them, even when we are focusing on one particular level of behaviour (the latter being the learning, experimenting, connecting and reinforcing quartet).

If I wonder if I can write on the table (not on a paper on the table but on the table itself), I solicitate several levels of decision : whether I suddenly have the urge to write wherever it comes first possible to write on ; whether it should work, if my pen or whatever marker would leave any trace on the table, if it is possible to write on ; and at last, whether I am allowed to write on the table. You would have recognised here the three levels : the physiological sensation, the experience of my physical surroundings, and the feeling of the moral debt.

Such are the levels of the three paradoxes studied in the former essays : the sensorimotor paradox of the hand (physical level), the symbolic paradox of the word *me* (moral level), and the capacity to stand alone in the silencing of the stream of conscious (physiological level).

The fact that all levels of this network are connected means that, as we saw, spaces are not neutral. They are as well connected to our physical experience as they are connected to our moral experience and to our more intimate reflection. Then, it appears quite obvious that identity relies on those three aspects of experience as a capacity to action and to realisation of the self in their environment.

If I can't climb and step on the table like the chimpanzee would do, it is not because I wouldn't have the urge and phantasy to be inspired to do so. It would not be either because it is physically impossible. It would only be because I don't judge that I am allowed to do so.

Morals prevail over the two other aspects. Then, what is to phantasy remains to phantasy, and what is to physiological impulse has to be tamed, calmed, driven somewhere else, to an urge to occupy myself in another work.

Identity is composed by heterogenous spaces that are at the same time moral spaces, physical spaces and inevitably, physiological spaces - what I'm feeling inside. The better connected to each other, the more resilient identity is to shocks, and the more open it remains to learning more. It is also more confident as to the level of integration of the moral, physical and physiological

28 Inspired by Jaak Panksepp's classification, in Jaak Panksepp, Stephen Asma, Glennon Curran, Rami Gabriel & Thomas Greif, *The Philosophical Implications of Affective Neuroscience*, « A Synopsis of Affective Neuroscience – Naturalizing the Mammalian Mind », *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 2012.

values of its *being inside* of its social and natural environment.

The heterogenous social, natural and intimate spaces any individual experiences are either solved or damaged. If one of those spaces is determined by the privilege of the other(s) over me and it, their domination and their aggression stronger, it is a place where my capacity to action and realisation - as well as my being a person to be trusted for my capacity to listen and comfort - is a place that has been damaged. I am not safe there. However, I might be forced to go and be present there, suffering this moral, physical or physiological damage anyway.

This is where psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott's *false self* takes place, a mask of patterned behaviour to prevent myself from being exposed on a more intimate level than the one I am capable to defend and protect. To a greater extent in pathological cases, this is where George Devereux's and Darian Leader's statements on the personal strategies of self-cure and self-protection prove right.

If I am hurt on such a level to a particular experience, in a place not communicated to the others and not connected to the rest of the network of identity, on any level whatsoever capable to resist, this particular spot in the unconscious will fall collapsing. And depending on the weight of it, the identity is at risk of collapsing as well.

On the contrary, even if a traumatic experience happens in my life, the fact that it should be nested enough in a tighter web - by the solidity and efficiency of my actions in the other spaces -, an effect of solidarity and share of the reception of the impact occurs. The physiological distress is redistributed to the stimulation and emulation of the other fields of my unconscious network. Then it would be more sustainable, and I am more resilient.

The mind as incarnate in the body and in the sensorimotor experience and ontogenic development has been notably put forward, as mentionned previously, by neurobiologist Francisco Varela. We also lean on Ellen Dissanayake's neuroaesthetic studies as well as neurobiologist Gerald Edelman's views on the necessity for the human mind to *delay or lag neural responses* to their environment.

Thus, this nesting of the three levels of the human experience is fundamental. Because no one of the aspects of this experience can be put aside. Everything is codependent, like a spider web. If a fly gets stuck in a part of the web that has not been successfully connected to the rest of it, it will damage the whole ensemble, and the spider won't be able to correct it by getting to the trapped bug. It will have to wait until the damaged part of the web tears and falls apart. Then only, there could be a possibility to correct and and rebuild, to refabricate with its own matter, its own fluids.

So is important the capacity to analyse the intrication everyone shares with the whole of humans' social and moral structure we are aware of, because everyone comes to be for themselves a part of its centre. To recreate connections through positive corrective actions in the social world, which means we do not specify, allows us to create connections possible between spaces we thought there were no connections to be granted.

To shed light on a part of the landscape makes us more comfortable with communicating between and amongst them. We are able to move and importantly, to choose to move.

Then, we come with structure, rooted deep enough not having to think or mind it. It becomes genuinely part of us and thus, we become more open to other points of view.

The place the hands can't seek - III - Self-destructiveness and the urban world

[On the relations between neoliberal ideology, violence in the morals and the restraint pushed on the individuals' perspectives.]

To think demands distance. It demands room, space, and the possibility to distend time. Saint Augustine was quite aiming at it when he wondered about this *distentio animi* in his Confessions. Time is correlated to the distance you can walk freely on your own accord. The greater this distance is, the longer time you get. Otherwise, if you are stuck in the tiny room of obligations, you cannot but withdraw into your own capacity to make room in your imagination.

That is why we are talking now about self-destructiveness as something that is a lack of room, and then the *don't know what to do* with the violence of it. Whenever the social environment reduces the possibilities for genuine expression from the individuals, pushing them to fit into the tiniest room of the acceptable alienation, violence is inevitable.

As well does the urban world in those neoliberal times. If we remember Pierre Bourdieu's ideas we mentioned from his article titled *L'essence du néolibéralisme*²⁹, the strategy of neoliberal ideology is to erase all the collective structures between the corporations and the capital, including the states. We also remember from Hannah Arendt - in her *The Crisis in Culture* - that the modern world was all about being on the breach of something looming in the depth of us.

Then, it is all about pressure. And pressure means room or lack of room. It means how much the distance is available or condemned.

We focused very much, in our later work, on the interconnections between morals and violence. Notably, on how the restriction of aggression came to provoke the birth of violence as a consequence of its prohibition. Violence, for those living under the moral laws, is first of all the knowledge of its own banishment. You are to be excluded from the course of society for being violent.

But, also, you are not allowed to be violent against the very violence that the same society pushes onto you, shall it be justified or not. Society justifies that being so many under its rules, there should be order to maintain the interests and integrity of all. Except that if the society induces the eradication of the middle-space, the room for all to pertain to the order of society, we enter the reign of unequal participation.

Quoting Henry David Thoreau : 'Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also in prison.'³⁰ That was yesterday. Today, we have Naomi Klein³¹ showing us that crisis were and are still used by governments to pass on unpopular laws against the same interests and integrity of the people they govern.

The way from the source of moral and social order - those pushing the laws of this order, should they be explicit or tacit - to the living matter of societies - the individuals and their natural environment - has to be direct in order to charge those at the bottom of the hierarchy with pressure and precarity. Capitalism and the delusion of democracy allow this system to endure for a while by creating enough precarity so people are kept in fear, and at the same time enough illusion of comfort so they can still try to believe someone else is going to solve the problem in the meantime.

²⁹ In *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 1998, <https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1998/03/BOURDIEU/3609>

³⁰ In Henry David Thoreau, *Civil Disobedience*, 1849.

³¹ In Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, June 2008.

Hence, we are on the breach. And as we would pressure people in precarity, erasing all alternative ways to build another kind of society by damaging social and economical structures as well as impoverishing our natural resourcing, we are at the same time damaging the spaces for valuable social action. This way, we narrow people's mental room for deriving aggression from its source to a long-term creative act.

If the only alternative to self-destructive behaviour you leave - not being able to express aggressive energy to morally positive outlets - are the ways of consumption, you are only giving the individuals another mean to express a short-term destructive act. Because to consume is to consume. It is a destructive impulse that once you have consumed your object, the object of your desire, it is not there anymore, and you have to keep on wanting for more of it.

Therefore, there is a problem to be solved with the urban world, because the urban infrastructures belong and came from private entities mostly, so they are only lent to their 'customers'. It is made out of consumption points and channels for transportation. Both of them are treating human and living beings like components. And it has become so widely and so globally accepted that it has now become norm.

How to fit in and how to be carried out through these functional components of what looks like a most predictable circuit ? First, by forgetting the steps of handworking. Our daily manufactured objects have also printed in their identification the opacity of the means by which they have been produced. Very few of the objects we own are that we have built ourselves, with our own hands. So the connection with the prime matter, mineral and natural matter, has been broken and taken up by the symbolic : the object of desire.

Since Edward Bernays who wrote *Propaganda* in 1928 - his later book *Crystallizing Public Opinion* inspired none the least than Goebbels and the Nazis propaganda - and *The Engineering of consent* in 1947, after working for the Wilson government in 1917 as well as for private companies on the manipulation of the masses, tools are not just tools anymore : they are most of all the support for new objects of desire. If the inventor of the *public relation* system did not invent the markers of social class that could have been most daily objects and clothing, he pertained to their generalisation.

Hence the urban world is deeply participating of this upholding of the impoverishment of people's environment. Because the objects of consumption have been taken up by symbolic objects of desire. Therefore, these symbolic objects have absorbed the social and moral values given to the individuals' interaction with each others and society. Then the urban infrastructures pertain to the pressure we hold on social obedience.

'If you want to desire, as you can't desire anymore in any other way than the ones left for you to consume and seek, you can only ask for the upholding of an order that although unequal, guarantees that you won't have to build everything out of nothing.' As we are floating on the surface of manufactured objects that constitute our daily environment, we have no access to primary matter we could arrange our reality from, free from the moral debt of lending them from somebody else.

What we can't borrow from our natural environment anymore, because resources have been privatised, we can only try to dream it though we are constantly kept in a state of moral debt toward the daily objects we accepted to use - granting private companies with our consent. Why ? Because we wanted to stick to the course of desire, that is vehiculed in our societies through social objects of desire, full of private interests from which we would get no benefits.

Then it becomes self-destructive, because we are at least conscious enough or alerted that we are in a state of alienation, of submission, of addiction, that we come to the point we want to forget that we really are, by making it 'normal'. We start believing there is no other way to do it, that

the power of the oppressor is too strong, that money and the phantasies of omnipotence of the few leaders of this world will ever win over public interests.

This may partly be one of the origins of the mythology of the nerd, pointed out by Darian Leader's remarkable work on daily objects and their relation to the hands.³² Somehow, this mythology is presenting us people capable of passing through the surface of the generally available technology. Contrarily to the average people, they have the capacity, like magic and omnipotent power, to get their hands dirty and fix the heart of unsound machines.

They are here, breaking the link of moral debt we have toward these objects that seem more and more to belong to those who created them : the era of connected object, of an impalpable cloud world through which datas are flowing. Urban network gets blurred by the abstract world of data, and the design of the connected objects tends to be more and more spherical.

We are in a way pushed to forget about the hardware, to focus on the abstraction of those objects presented as pure objects of desire, that we don't even have to touch anymore, that extend our action on the world... remotely.

The connection to the theory of the three paradoxes here is that it is at the heart of it. The hand I see but cannot grasp without extinguishing the object of desire it represents is a remotely influenced object. *I see it and I know I can move it*. From here to the remote-action on my environment, only one imaginary step is needed.

Its most obvious incarnation in pop-culture is none the less than the Force and Jedi powers in the Star Wars's saga. Jedis have the power to use the Force to bring objects to them, to lift them up or throw them away. Rising their hand, they summon an omnipresent and absolute supernatural force that gives them influence over their surroundings. It is a dream but a dream that may pull roots from the beginnings of human times.

To mind one's surroundings and to plunge into the desire to be connected to their objects as much as one is connected to their own hands, though they can appear alien in the world of vision, this is not other postulate than the one of the theory we are presenting. Somehow, the imaginary force of the Jedis are the hands gotten dirty in a symbolic world where getting their hands really dirty is not enough to desire. Maybe thousands of years ago, but not anymore, or shall it be in contrast with the educated style. Dirty is wild, but only wild by contrast.

Leopold von Sacher-Masoch's novels are interesting in this point of view - also noted by philosopher Gilles Deleuze. The portraits in his stories were very much detailed as a function of all the small objects that could tell the social resonance of who the characters are. The values of these characters are given by contrast between the outfits they wear and who they are underneath their costume. Like the example of the fan given by Darian Leader in his book *Hands*, Sacher-Masoch's stories are full of such details that already in the nineteenth century, turned those objects into reasons to desire.

The fact that we are stressing today's generalisation of one old aristocratic fashion of enjoying leasure as a room for desire doesn't rub the genealogy of it. The norms of today take their origins in a slow and chaotic setting throughout the centuries. Cultures and their objects act likewise : we tend to forget where they came from and how they got in our hands, the steps it took. Yet now we have the obligation to look backward and see the traces of their upbringing.

How then can the urban world be related to self-destructiveness ? Because it is based on

32 In Darian Leader, *Hands*, 2016.

predictability, mostly. Depending on the degree of this predictability we ask from our environment, we tend to narrow down our own authority over what we do and why we are doing it. Moral debt is fragmented. All those objects of economical and symbolic debt are working like an opaque screen hiding the forest we use to create them. But it is only happening because we are pressured in time and space not to see anything else but the surface of it.

The mythology of the nerds stages those who have a look on what is going on behind. Yet, we should all do the same and call for means to action to set it right. For that, we have to learn to desire other objects, moral objects that are working in the long-term, and that are permissive to everyone.

German philosopher - inspirer of Marx - Georg Wilhelm Hegel's dialectics of the Master and the Slave told us one thing about the constant effort of the Master to hold pressure on the working Slave. To hold power on something or someone is the same as living with the hands stuck in the middle between oneself and the others. But it is only leading them to stand split with the alien self.

We, as a species, only stepped forward the monopoly of our environment over us by understanding we had to resume our conversation with it. Being stuck in the phantasy wouldn't have led us nowhere else. If the holding gives the measure of what to do and what we can do, the only way we can do it is to accept the others as other alien selves longing to communicate and share some common ground.

The phantasy of supernatural power only has efficiency when shared, and hopefully played with. So we wish that opening the breach for a new landscape for thinking, we would help the best parts of our minds to settle and start to play.

The place the hands can't seek - IV - The unbreakable objects and the empty hands

[On child development, multi-sensory imprints, ontogenic and phylogenic perspectives.]

'Lorsqu'il découvre les travaux des éthologistes, [John] Bowlby est à la recherche d'une théorie capable d'expliquer les observations cliniques qu'il a rassemblées en quinze ans de travail à la Tavistock Clinic de Londres. [...] le concept d'empreinte lui semble beaucoup plus intéressant [que les théories psychologiques de l'époque] : chez certaines espèces, on l'a vu, les petits sont génétiquement prédisposés à des réactions dont l'effet est de maintenir la proximité avec un individu particulier, bien différencié - en général la mère - qui sera préféré entre tous. [...] Il appelle attachement ce système biologique. Étant donné sa fonction de protection, ce système doit reposer sur des mécanismes sûrs, codés dans l'organisme, et être présent dès la naissance. Bowlby suppose alors que la succion, le sourire, les pleurs, l'agrippement, le babillage et la poursuite sont les réponses instinctives sur lesquelles repose l'attachement. Ce système de réponse constitue l'homologue humain de la réponse d'agrippement qui, chez les autres primates, assure la proximité avec la mère. Et, comme l'ont montré les travaux des époux Harlow, l'agrippement à la fourrure est l'une des bases du lien émotionnel entre le petit singe et sa mère.' In *L'éthologie : Histoire naturelle du comportement*, Jean-Luc Renck & Véronique Servais, Ed. du Seuil, 2002, pp. 292-293

Psychoanalyst John Bowlby was very much influenced by ethologist Konrad Lorenz's concept of *imprinting* on the innate quality of attachment and its utility for survival. This imprinting is still present in our memory, as the quality of *what is in our hands* is omnipresent.

This article will not be a theoretical text as much as it is now a question of memories, of imprints. We learn very soon as children that there are objects we can break and some others that we cannot break, that we can't even touch. *We are not allowed to* and that is the first rule of the moral teaching. Our hands are empty of the objects we can't break, that seem to go fleeing from our reach.

If attachment is formed from the early moments of, first of all, mother-infant's interactions, this 'ballet' that paediatrician T. Berry Brazelton described, how do we cope with its fragmentation through the symbolic organisation of the law ? Temporal organisation of these primary interactions, studies show, is very precise. It is a mutual synchronisation - often reaching the range of tenth a second - and although very young, babies get to know the regularities of their interaction with their mother (or substitute) and develop expectations toward their reactions.

Brazelton's postulate was then that babies were not only passively shaped by their environment but on the contrary, very much active and sollicitating in their relation to their mother and surroundings.

But whenever you are introducing a delay in what psychoanalyst Daniel Stern called the *implicit relational knowing*³³ - as Brazelton shew with his experiment of the 'impassive face'³⁴ -, the world is shaken. There is a disruption occurring. As well, the dissociative connection from the hand(s) to its objects is turning unclear.

Memory won't bring the object back.

³³ We discussed this concept in the second article of the Three paradoxes section, *Empirical and theoretical research*.

³⁴ The mother presents herself in front of her two-month old baby and keeps, whatever happens, an impassive face for three minutes. Babies are first disappointed and try not to look at their mother (generally in vain), then seem desperate and overwhelmed, and eventually become withdrawn. Mothers also are much perturbed by the experience and often feel like abandoning their baby. Yet, the little child will generally recover from it to confidence again in time.

Now, let us be attentive to psychologist René Zazzo's marvel for the fact that he witnessed, in 1983, that babies recognised their mother's smell since the tenth day of their life (so way before the two or three years it was believed to be before). After further experiments, psychophysiolgist Hubert Montagner's team reduced this time to three days from which babies could recognise and *prefer* their mother's smell from any other woman's with a baby of the same age. Montagner concluded that olfactory attachment, present amongst most mammals, was also an important feature of attachment in our species.

Psychologist Rachel Herz goes even farther by stating that the connection between smell and emotion is primary. In the brain, the rhinencephalon, developed from the ancient olfactory structures, is one comprising the olfactive bulb and structures having a part in the regulation of the organism's emotional responses (limbic system). To the psychologist, 'emotion is essentially an abstract and cognitive version of olfaction'³⁵, their analogical function being to signal to the organism if something is good or not, if we should come closer to it or run away.

Ethology applied to human behaviour is then stressing something very important to us : what is missing that we miss so much ?

Now then, it is time to break the stick. The self is alien (we partly explained in previous articles why), but why is it so much ? If you are looking at your own hand(s), as to the paradox we were investigating into, what do you expect to find ? And what is missing ?

Precisely, something to grasp - but why ? Because they lost contact to the ground and to the branches of the trees they used to be the medium for. Now they are grasping other things but more importantly, they lost the smell of the other. Being constantly in touch with something else, they used to be defined by their relation to their surroundings. As they lost touch with their surroundings, by being lifted in the air, thanks to bipedalism, they lost the quality of being something else *for a reason*.

If my hand is covered with a substance that is alien to me (dirt, for example, or an edible substance), they are alien for a reason : because their smell and touch and taste are altered. And if I look at them closely, I will recognise that they are empty, that the alien part that should be here *as the hands are supposed to bring up and carry the alien things*, is not; and then, I will wonder what *is* alien in them being empty, missing an altered thing to give them the meaning of *bringing them to me*. The short-term feature expected from them, activating short neural circuits, is to touch alien contact and to bring those of interest to *me*.

Primatologist Jan Van Hoof proposed in 1972³⁶ a phylogenic line to the evolution, for instance, of our laughter and smiling. The latter would notably appear among chimpanzees as a friendly or neutral signal from a dominant animal to invite one subjugated to contact. Laughter would on the contrary appear during more turbulent social games, like tickling. Yet, never laughter and smiling come together in the primate species.

Here we find something equivalent : the hands are not supposed to come without something alien in or on them to fulfill their short-term use. Yet by keeping them aloft standing in front of me, to be gazing at them and most especially at *it*, I realise that there isn't in or on it anything I would have expected to find. The short-term neural circuit is contradicted.

35 In Jean-Luc Renck & Véronique Servais, *L'éthologie : Histoire naturelle du comportement*, Ed. du Seuil, 2002, p. 299.

36 In Jan Van Hoof, *A comparative approach to the phylogeny of laughter and smiling*, in R.A. Hinde *Non Verbal Communication*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 303-321.

Yet if nevertheless I keep on staring at it and definitely wanting something from it, this contradiction is turning into a void expectation - fascination, that is here a psychotic feature. I would get nothing from it but my own smell, my own matter, my own skin, my own body. However it *has* to carry something alien. My hands are defined by the alien they carry or lean on - the ground. They are now not rooted in the ground, on the tree, in my surroundings ; but in my body.

My hands, represent *my* body, *my* reality because they are empty from further expected short-term and fixed action pattern (to use Bowlby's term). They carry the void, the emptiness and the capacity still to be wanting something, something very deep from them, one existence of something else, something meaningful, an intensity, a smell, a *different* smell still there and an arousal from that smell, that I can swallow - but that they don't have.

Hence, I start creating the first symbolic object of all : the desire that something that is missing comes to be. And for that, I start *delaying or lagging neural responses* (Gerald Edelman's imperative). And the images of what is missing that I would like to see being then start to come as something *possible*, but not yet achieved.

The unbreakable objects, the symbolic objects created by the others or their absence are the ones I can't assimilate or swallow or suck out, that can't vanish because they are not *here* - they are *there*, out there, somewhere and coming - fear being part of desire and one neural response we have with the lowest threshold. The fear to lose or the fear to be lost. Hands, what is *not different* but other than me, are the perfect mirror. But they are first because they always reflect the same thing : identity - the time for difference through repetition.

One cannot trully lose what they can't get. As well, they don't always get what they expect. That is why we keep on repeating : maybe next time, I will have more luck than the first. Like in the *Fort-da* game witnessed and reported by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920). *Me, the child, I keep on throwing the spool and pulling the thread so it would come back*. Memory - what does come back ? And more importantly, what does *never* come back ?

Response: The fact that a constant contact to the ground has been lost. The fact that the constant touch of something alien, except the air, is lost. The fact that other objects have gotten in the way. The fact that I can't swallow or suck out most of my daily objects without breaking a social rule. The fact that the objects I can't swallow are swallowing me in their symbolical absence - the empty hand, grasping nothing and meaning nothing. The fact that I am in debt toward these objects turned unbreakable because they represent the social order and the moral laws. The fact that thinking is a sinking, only risen up again by the fact that the objects of social order are keeping me up or I will be expelled. The fact I have to choose the objects, physical or symbolical, that I want to be surrounded with.

The definition of the home is the one that means territory where my action is desirable. Empty hands are a way to mean that the house is still empty, that no territory has been set for me to be at one place.

The fact that we have lost contact with matter is significant. It is taking more and more advantage over us. The anguish of the empty hands is *when are they going to be full again*, with something I could assimilate and identify with. Identifying to my empty hand(s) is identifying to nothing *yet happened*. It is an abyss. And it is a sensorimotor paradox because I am delaying the use of my very hands - and I am losing the ground.

The symbolic, the *not yet happened*, has become the ground, and that is the articulation. We, in a ritualised pattern, usually slam the door when are upset, angry, contesting a familial or other forms of authority without allowing ourselves to destroy the persons or their symbol. We are only trying to destroy the pain by remotely manifesting our means for destruction through the delayed

slamming of the door.

Symbolically, when I am performing the physical effort of throwing the door to its lock, the impact of it hasn't yet happened. But when it has, remotely, it is not I but the door who expressed, on a symbolical level, the fact that I am feeling upset. Delaying is essential not to hurt the people, the living beings, but the fact that I have to express attachment in another way than a direct form of *grasping the mother*, for instance.

There is nothing in my hands but the only symbolic objects I am left with : to acknowledge, possibilities to action, and maybe eventually, some realisations too.

The place the hands can't seek - V - Inertia, metaphor, oxymoron and conceptual flexibility

[On approximation, mathematical metaphor and differential calculus.]

'Oui, je suis horrifié à l'idée qu'une femme que j'aime et qui a répondu à mon amour puisse se donner à un autre sans aucune pitié pour moi. Mais dans ce cas aurai-je encore le choix ? Si j'aime cette femme, si je l'aime à la folie, dois-je lui tourner fièrement le dos et périr dans mon orgueil ? Dois-je me tirer une balle dans la tête ? J'ai deux idéaux féminins. Si je ne trouve pas une femme noble et radieuse, une femme fidèle, bienveillante, avec laquelle partager mon destin, alors pas de demi-mesure, pas de compromission ! Je préfère être livré à une créature immorale, infidèle et impitoyable. La grandeur égoïste de ce genre de femme en fait aussi un idéal. Si je ne peux goûter pleinement, entièrement, aux joies de l'amour, je veux boire jusqu'à la lie le calice de ses souffrances et de ses supplices. Je veux être trahi et maltraité par la femme que j'aime. Plus elle sera cruelle et plus je serai content. C'est aussi une jouissance !' In Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, *La Vénus à la fourrure*, Editions Rivages poche, 1870 (2009), p. 64

The power of Sacher-Masoch's words in his famous novel *Venus in Furs* cannot leave us without great resonance if we observe the world we are living in. We have discussed in earlier articles some of the specificities of the neoliberal ideology and its systemisation. What we have forgotten to say, is that it has been engineered with people who studied on the human psyche, in many ways - even not recommandable ones.

When Bill Clinton formulated an apology for the secret conduct of unethical human radiation experiments in the United States during the Cold War (1944-1974), in a speech about the Bioethics Report at the White House conference of october 3rd 1995, what message did it send ? It happened because the families of the victims raised complaints and advocated for compensation. Advisory Committee, directed by Dr. Ruth Faden, was charged in 1993 to investigate what happened during this period in hospitals, universities and military bases, where many times the individuals' rights, interests and knowledge were ignored. Files had to be declassified.

Like the War led against Iraq after september 11th, United States can apparently afford to appear like the bad guys picking a fight against other bad guys, an by the same time lying to their constituents to do so. As well, when we learned, just after the American subprime crisis in 2015, that Goldman Sachs bank helped to hide the true extent of Greece's national debt in 2001 - doubling it in the process while charging 600 million euros the service -, it came alongside a large history of lies and truth unfold.

Yet the United States are not the only devil in the party. In France, it seems not to be a problem for President Emmanuel Macron to be celebrated 'Champion of the Earth' in New-York and allowing at the same time catastrophic oil drillings in Guyane.

Oxymorons have become a political norm.

Without being versed in conspiracy theories to an excessive extent, we know we can simply look at History and the way it is constantly revisited, rediscovered. Unfortunately, it is also mostly veiled by the growing pauperisation and the insecurity of the populations of almost every countries in the world.

The figure of the bad, cynical government doesn't scare at all nor prevents the tenants of the latter to embody this charge. 'Democracy needs the people's consent, so we have to create the

consent', that was public relation's founder Edward Bernays's motto.

Those governments, serving the neoliberal financial structures, are cooperating with the marketing and public relation industry to crush people and at the same time still appear desirable. We hate them, the devilish capitalists, yet we love what they provide us with at the same time. Remember, synchronicity is the key, because we can't cope with it.

In a system defined by attraction, by gravity, by fate, there is an irresistible force of inertia taking hold of us. And inertia is a differential system.

The definition of inertia in Physics is that : A body distant enough from other bodies persists with its state of rest or rectilinear and uniform movement. Which means that the faster an object goes, the more energy it amasses and the more difficult it is to move it or slow it down. Inspired by that definition, the famous Albert Einstein equation $E=MC^2$ was in fact using light speed - the C of Celerity - as a limit, as a crushing effect of inertia. You can't pass it.

In fact, it came from the Lorentz transformation (after physicist Hendrick Lorentz) that allowed Einstein to express the time coordinate - in the four dimensions Minkowski space - by the

equation : $t = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{v^2}{c^2}}}$. If the speed of the object - v - reaches light speed - 300 000 km/s -, the

equation annuls because the fraction is not defined and then impossible ($t = \frac{1}{0}$).

This is the mathematical expression of the limit to the range of speed any physical objects could reach. And it is of course a differential problem.

Differential analysis was introduced in Mathematics by Fermat, Newton and Leibniz in the XVIIth century, inspired by ideas dating from Archimedes (IIIrd century B.C.). The main idea was that ensembles of numbers formed series. You could count the numbers, as detached sequences of the series. (0, 1, 2, 3, ... 45, ... for the whole numbers).


Analysis is then the branch of Mathematics which tries to approach a value by framing it. For instance, $15,219 < 15,22 < 15,221$. We try to approach the value of 15,22 in the order of one thousandth. Depending on how close we want to get to the exact point where 15,22 should be, to the limit of its reality, we would only add decimals.

This is infinite. In fact, differential calculus is working from infinite and infinitesimal analysis. This means that the spectrum of mathematical values is continuous, and that we can approach those values as part of a continuum. Just like matter, the living, the mind.

The operation of the *limit* is the operation by which you evaluate the behaviour of a function when the variable (x for example) is approaching a certain limit - like zero or the infinite. Using that, differential calculus permits to find a function's derivative.

For that, you would try to compress one moment in the continuum of your function - as long as it is a continuous and a differentiable one -, for example : one moment in the acceleration of an object, until you've reduced this moment the closest to zero.

The ratio between, let us say, the value of the speed of the object by the time encompassed in the *moment* gotten close to zero is giving you two *very close* points : a straight line (in basic cases). This straight line appears to be the tangent to the curved line of the function (if the graph of the function is representing a curved line).



Then, still, differential analysis is forced to work by series, should it be by tiny bits. Result is that on this *point* made out of two very close points, on this moment, the curve (the continuous acceleration, for instance) is crushed under a straight line (the determination of the instantaneous speed of the object).

Let us now pretend that we push an acceleration on an object in some abstract conditions : once we would stop the acceleration, the object would not slow down nor continue to accelerate on its own. The derivative is that : at a certain point of the acceleration, we shut the engines down, and then the object is set in space and time at a certain unchanging speed.

This is inertia. You derive something straight, an immutable force, linear, from a changing, accelerating or turning one.

'The knowledge of quantities must as well be guided, as Geometry itself demonstrates, by the qualities and the similitudes.'³⁷ This eternal dilemma stated by Leibniz whether you should focus on form and identity or on applications and indifferentiation, has been in other words summarised by French philosopher Gilles Deleuze :

'C'est la notion même de limite qui change complètement de signification : elle ne désigne plus les bornes de la représentation finie, mais au contraire la matrice où la détermination finie ne cesse pas de disparaître et de naître, de s'envelopper et de se déployer dans la représentation orgique. Elle ne désigne plus la limitation d'une forme, mais la *convergence* vers un fondement ; non plus la distinction des formes, mais la corrélation du fondé avec le fondement ; non plus l'arrêt de la puissance, mais l'élément dans lequel la puissance est effectuée et fondée. Le calcul différentiel en effet n'est, pas moins que la dialectique, affaire de "puissance", et de puissance de la limite.'³⁸

In his philosophical exploration, Deleuze parallels the continuous action of infinite(simal) shrinking and distending in differential calculus with Hegel's dialectics of the negative and positive. As well, we find reminiscences of that thinking in Hannah Arendt's inspection of the rupture, of the major collapsing of Western Culture during the Second War (*The Crisis in Culture*, 1961).

³⁷ In G. W. Leibniz, *Mathesis universalis : écrits sur la mathématique universelle*, 'Mathesis Universalis', Ed. Vrin, 2018, p. 123.

³⁸ In Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition*, Ed. PUF, coll. Epiméthée, 1968 (2011), p. 62.

That is where we catch up with earlier suggestion that we were living in a system of society that manifested what Sacher-Masoch would have called 'a contract'.

No straight lines can be found in nature. Even geometrical spider webs don't really have straight lines but entangled lines. The idea of something infinite but that in some way we could cross, a road, that could carry our thoughts and participation, our steps, our chanting it, this is plain human creation. We organise and we create predictability amongst the chaotic and permissive *happening* of natural living and mineral perpetual breathing.

The ontogeny of the mind is difficult to catch, to fully grasp either. Yet somehow, we are creatures of metaphor, and the Mathematics as well as the Physics are using such tools as drawings and symbolical markings of language.

What does it mean ? That it works through a system of meaning, signifyers, that convey our imageries of the world. That also means that the cohabitation between two different logics - the natural and the moral logics - is still in course.

The straight line is that you can't fight without a fight back. So you are trying to break the unconscious with an inertia strategy. You would like to protest an unequal system, but you don't want to loose much more than there would be to win immediately, in the short term. However in the long term, all you would need to do is to overthrow the verticality of power by, as La Boétie said, removing the base of the tyrants' statue.

But the problem is still a matter of masses. The heavier the mass, the more difficult it is to move it, turn it or slow it down. Inertia. The contract. From a curved line that would demand flexibility of the mind, to a straight line that only demands to stay still. Not accelerate, nor slow down. Only stay the way things are.

We love to hate them, those who clearly take advantage on our preference for not fighting, not so big a monster, not so heavy a mass of aggressiveness. So we fight small problems. We damage the network. We phantasise. Under the straight line, taming us. Erasing the alternatives. The change.

Sacher-Masoch's dialectics is that in absence of liberty, we resist change, and we chose to move a straight line back to a curved one. Only we are vibrating in a prison, and whatever hits us on the back, we still agree to be moral people, docile, and not to fight.

The place the hands can't seek – VI – Physics, hermeneutics, language and the conditions of interpretation

[On entropy.]

'The Spirit produces itself, it makes itself what it is. [...] This process, mediation of itself with itself and by itself (and not by another) implies that the Spirit differentiates itself in distinct Moments. [...] All that is historical is a step of this self-knowledge.' Georg W. F. Hegel, *Reason in History*, II. The realisation of the Spirit in History, « The ultimate end »

In her article on one Hans-Georg Gadamer's 1977 text about hermeneutics, poetry and language, French philosopher Isabel Weiss commented³⁹ : 'All language is a relation and the human itself is a relation – it is not only a producer of relations, it is related, diversely, to things and beings. [...] It is as well our connection to things that escapes the obsolescence affecting the consumed things or the words and ideas that come and go without finding anchor. [...] The relation between the I of the poet and the I of the reader [...] isn't an identification but a coming closer together⁴⁰, a connection that takes the shape of a meeting around and next to things.'

We could not help thinking of Freud's allegation that the erotic drives are more plastic, more subject to derivation and moves than the drives of destruction.⁴¹ The libido is up to shift and move, working at the service of pleasure, avoiding the stasis and easing the release of unpleasurable sensations.⁴² According to Freud, the objects of this release are indifferent, as long as the unpleasurable sensations are evacuated.

Then to summarise his *second Topic*, he states : 'the id is totally amoral, the ego endeavours to be moral, the super-ego can become hyper-moral and then as cruel as only the id can be.'⁴³

In this article, we wish to speak of the conceptions of reality, shaped through language and the *implicit relational meanings*⁴⁴ it implies throughout life. More specifically, we have been intrigued by those Freud's words that 'What has been in this way discarded by repression opposes, in analysis, the ego, and the analysis finds itself in front of the task to suppress the resistances that the ego manifests when we are dealing with the repressed.'⁴⁵

One concept from Physics comes in mind that is the concept of *couple* in Mechanics. Couple is the balance between two opposite and equivalent forces. If we trust Isabel Weiss's commentary on Gadamer's text that the poem is substantial because it has the ability to stand by itself, that it is an 'open and plastic stability', we can speculate over a connection between the conditions of interpretation through language, the poetic condition of language itself and our relation to reality.

'Whenever the ego adopts the characteristics of the object, it imposes itself to the id as an object of love so to speak, it tries to replace for it what it has lost saying : « You can love me too, see how I look like the object. »'⁴⁶ A force opposes the realisation of whatever proper energy of the

39 In Isabel Weiss, *Le langage : Herméneutique du poétique*, Revue Philopsis, 2014, <http://www.philopsis.fr/spip.php?article268>

40 We shall treat the relation of this idea to the paradox of the gazed hand in a following text.

41 In Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, « The two kinds of drives », 1923

42 Concepts developed by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

43 *Ibid.*, « The relations of dependence of the ego »

44 From psychoanalyst Daniel Stern's terms. See previous articles.

45 *Ibid.*, « Conscious and unconscious »

46 *Ibid.*, « The ego and the super-ego (ideal of the ego) »

body, as sensorimotor, is seen as an aggression to the moral laws and social norms. This force, first represented by the parents, is in a way synthesised in the individual's character, behaviour and psyche – what Freud called the super-ego, speaking for the id against any of the ego's transgressions.

So it is a struggle between forces, that has been internalised into self-inflicted rules and restrictions of behaviour. The latter has to be moral to be fitting the social milieu of the person. Poetry can then be seen as a space of freedom amongst the diverse spaces of action – some of which have become spaces of reaction and inhibition. But why ?

In Physics, we can parallel the birth of variational calculus. It started between the XVIIth and XVIIIth century with French mathematician Pierre de Fermat's principle (1662) that in order to go from one point to another, light did not use the shortest way but the way that would take the least time. Leonhard Euler continued this mathematical observation of the optimisation phenomena in the physical laws. Yet it was Pierre de Maupertuis who allegedly proposed first his principle of Least Action for Mechanics, then taken up and clarified by Joseph-Louis de Lagrange in his *Analytical Mechanics* of 1788.

In other words, if you are on a running train and drop a marble from the window, this one would touch the ground using the way that demands the least effort. The trajectory, the arch described by it would be mathematically expressed by the principles of extremum. For example, the 2nd principle of Thermodynamics states that : *a thermodynamic system reaches balance for a maximum of its entropy*, entropy being the degree of disorder of a system ; for instance, a tank of gas. The more you reduce the volume of the tank with the same quantity of gas, the higher the pressure raises and the more chaotic the behaviour of its particles is.

This internal chaos cannot reduce but only increase or find balance ; or you would have to transfer the gas to another system. Anyway, the mass of energy would be contained in a lower volume, and the effort pushed on the structure of the tank would increase. This is the inertia of entropy.

Relation demands stability and stability demands attention and then, a certain level of identification to the objects of attention. Yet if the physical reality is fluid because matter is dynamic, the rules of our expectations are not often. Energy is contained, and it is expected to be transferred to another system.

Hence, the poem is an open system of meaning and expectation to action. We don't have to act the poem, the poem is acting us. But we need a circulation, to find fluidity where the vanishing character of fluids has been banned. The moral laws demand predictability from us – then we wipe out our wastes.

The poem stands by itself because it takes the way to the heart and creative nature of language that demands the least effort. It demands the least effort to the language of the poem, but it may not demand less effort from the reader or the poet themselves. The poem is in a way *made by itself* inside of this moment of meeting of the poet with the subject of writing the poem, that is expressing, somehow, the desire of the dynamic self – or the id.

It makes a deal with the moral restrictions. It reverses the thing. It is not anymore the ego that has to identify with the objects of obedience that the super-ego, representing moral order, presents. It *demand*s the super-ego to identify with the ego, to help it invest the chaotic and plastic non-communicable part of the self.⁴⁷ And it does so that the *mnesic traces* of experience contained in the words of language reflect on the world and personal reality. The latter is shaped by the

47 From Donal W. Winnicott's term.

representations of both the structures of culture and structures of the self.

Following Isabel Weiss's lead and according to Gadamer, we understand that Poetics is included in Hermeneutics, and not the opposite. As well, the metaphoric impact that Sciences take over the way we perceive reality is important. The scales of space and time are important.

In 1948, physicist Richard Phillips Feynman reunited Fermat, Maupertuis, Euler, Lagrange and others' ideas from variational system to formalise the calculus of *path integrals*, as a new vision given to the Lagrange-Hamilton principle. It was inaugurating probabilistic approach to quantum scales. Path integrals allow to calculate any wave function of a particle at the dynamic point r and time t as the sum of terms that each are attached to a possible trajectory of the particle to get to r at the same time t .

What is important in that is not only the perspective of Quantum Physics, but the fragmentation of reality. Probabilistic approach gained many other fields, like high-technology industry, (bio)chemistry, sociology, public relations... It pertained to a fragmentation of reality, in course with a political agenda. We wager on presence. Unlike the poem, that has a source in the inalienable nature of language, probabilistic reality does not *stand by itself*. It is pretty much an idlike world, where the moral structures are vacant. It is fluid but with no room and time for the edification of an identity. Identification has become obsolete for lack of a distanced mnesic structure.

Freud uses the expression of *nostalgia for the father* when describing the mastering of the Oedipus complex by the ego and the submission to the id. When the reality is fragmented, there are too many partial objects to invest. We have learnt to abandon most of them as children, when taught to obey by the moral rules. Those investments are sedimented, as described by Freud. As such, they could become the object of poetry, located in language, in words, in the experiential reality they represent. But if there are too many objects belonging to the same father and we are so many under his rule and he has disappeared, how am I different from the other child next to me ?

The problem with fragmentation in mass consumption and politics, is that we owe everything to the same absent people, absent fathers, uninterested in their children, but only in the benefits of pressuring them. We have laws, but also those distant judges and markers, a distant authority, that we cannot grasp nor confront.

That is the manifestation of neoliberal ideology, to break up and shatter reality in bits, that can be consumed by anyone because they are cheap. But the cost of it, like psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva expressed in the *Powers of horror* (1980) on another topic, is the absorption of the alien, the disgust of not having anyone to answer to except from its wastes.

It is scattering the only few moral markers that parents or culture can be, crushing today's society's rules into crumbs of relation to the *political* – already noticed by Benjamin Constant in his 1819 speech at the Athénée Royal. Then we cannot but strictly go back to the anal stage and throw it up as mass consumption is compulsively making us *throw up* our sense of relation - relation in the manner poetry rises up. Psychoanalyst Elise Pestre - author of *La vie psychique des réfugiés* (2014) -, underlined in her preface of *The Ego and the Id*'s French edition the effects of a dismissed ideal as one of the origins of young people's commitment to modern terrorism – as well as the resistance to narcissistic collapsing.

We are forced to expect the whole of our emotional life from the crumbs of a lost hope in the unity of social, cultural and family structures. We are forced to pressure empty raisin skin bags through a symbolic order of how we should manage our immediate urges and anguish. But as authority is too distant, and the relational means to it too thin, too immature and inconsistent, we cannot but wait. And while we wait, we continue the fragmentation of the little resources we have –

and that's it.

We are literally trying to make poetry, or at least a valid narrative out of crap.

The place the hands can't seek - VII - Touch, the seize-wish and relational convexity

[A first introduction of the common object of relation in the intentional process.]

A short article to end this section and introduce a new one on the formalisation of hermeneutological theory. When can we talk about relation ? Certainly, when there is an understanding between two subjective parts. Hence, can we talk about 'relation to object' really ? According to our definition, it seems that we must define a bit more precisely what we mean by the concept of relation.

There cannot be a proper relation to object, because objects (or people seen as objects) can't express in any way whatsoever a proper and willing relation to us. The interpretation of their will to be related to us can only be imaginary or obtained by force.

Therefore, it might be important to redefine the relation to object with the concept of *relational expectation* toward the object. We expect the object to behave in a certain way, and we expect a possible response from it. Shall it never come, we anticipate and wish to create this participation from the object. And that is exactly what it is.

Etymology of the word by the way is from the Medieval Latin *ob-*, "in front of, towards, against", and *-iacere*, "to throw". We throw ourselves, our mind, our attention and intention in front of, towards and or against the thing we would like a participation of - an assimilation to our wage on reality.

If the object doesn't respond, it happens that in absence of a resistance that would be equivalent or stronger to our assimilating them, we manage to forge them an identity that should be coherent and corresponding to our wish to seize them. By that, we intend here to push forward another concept that would be the concept of *seize-wish*. Of course, it serves us as a representation of an elementary constituent of human behaviour.

It is common to most mammals that the general relational way to objects and siblings goes by touch, either with the mouth, muzzle, the whole body, the paw or, for the primates - including humans -, the hands.

What happens is that at the moment I realise that there is something close to me that I can't grasp - the hand within my own hand, this object that I can only *throw myself against* -, I can constitute an expectation that it would be to force it in a way to become something else to me that I could seize and assimilate - even only in my imagination. I would have to destruct the hand as something that doesn't fit, in order to make it fit my intentional world. And then I enter an imaginary relation to my hand, based on a relational expectation that in fact could not lead me anywhere.

Because when I am focused on my hand that I gaze, if I want to gaze it, I nor it can move. Therefore I cannot expect anything from it, except from the knowledge that some things that could virtually be assimilated in fact can't - at least without intending destruction on my own hand, which would be mad. I am forced myself to be in relation to my hand, that is stronger than me. As I can't destroy it to make it fit my will, it subjugates me with enough equivalent power to stop the ongoing of my seize-wish, of my sensorimotor use to grasp and seize things that I like to seize, eat or use.

Hence, we agree with psychoanalysts Darian Leader and Denis Vasse whom in their way took a close and benevolent look on psychosis. In the absence of response, the suridentification of *one's meaning in the world* with the object becomes the unique way to deal with an expectation too

high for solving the problem of loneliness and relational deprivation in an immediate way in space and time.

Yet, space and time are, as we mentioned it, morally set and orientated in the human's landscape of possibilities. And we propose that it became so because some things appeared to be indestructible, and represented a sharper knowledge of mortality - the same knowledge that drives psychosis, for which the general apprehension of the Arts and creative fields can often be a getaway. Not the acknowledgement and feeling that someone is dead or that myself, I risk to be assaulted by a predator for instance ; but that my *will* is put at a mortal risk.

I can't assimilate the annihilation of my will without destroying will - in its sensorimotor and symbolic vision - itself. Then, if our vision of the beginnings of the human structures of the mind appears close to the structures of psychosis, it is important to remind us that a true relation to others surely allowed us to make it viable in the long run for everyone. It may have been so as long as it became a shared consistency given to the common perception of reality.

Then we could bring up the concept of the *relational convexity* of the object. It appears that it is most likely that the perception of volumes is to be phenomenologically connected with the apprehension of the volume of objects while we seize them. Volume is metaphorically what can or cannot fit the hand(s). Hence this deficit of grasping symbolically the object may appeal to the apprehension of a volume that escapes destruction, assimilation and dissemination. Objects are resistant, convex and plain volumes.




Illustration 1: See a raw sketch of relational convexity model

This convexity leads to several things :

- 1) Focusing on one point of the object that is resisting assimilation doesn't stop intentional force to carry on its will to do so ;
- 2) The relational expectation to the object doesn't prevent the senses to be aware of the surrounding environment ;
- 3) In deficiency of vision that is fixed on the point of the object, it is a more general awareness, and more specifically an acoustic awareness of the surroundings that takes over the perception of surrounding reality - the measure of space and time.

Some may remember French philosopher Gilles Deleuze saying in one of his class on cinema⁴⁸ : 'The invisible, it is what can only be *seen*. The unspeakable, what can only be spoken.' What did it mean if not that if you wish to see something in particular, that you wish you could only *see it*, you would happen to only "see" the rest that is not included in that object, "see" what you did not expect to see but that is still there around - because the object is convex and escaping your assimilation.

In *Difference et répétition*, Deleuze spent some time dwelling on the hegelian dialectics of the negative and the positive. If we take this idea over, while you wish to make the object a *negative* of you, you are only making the rest, the negative and *otherly* side of your expectation to the object, stronger, more present, more real. By excluding the rest of your reality in your symbolical intention, you cannot suppress your general feeling of the world. You cannot suppress sensations.

And then, that is the magic of thinking : thinking is putting you in relation to a space and time belong to the negatives of your relational expectation to the objects you wish to seize. And that is it with the hand, whether it is the concrete hand or the symbolic hand : the hand that you cannot seek and seize with your own hand is merely made a negative version of the relation you wish to establish with it. It cannot give it to you without breaking the relation : if you move your hand, the relation to the object is over, because the object, the fascination making the hand an object, is over. Then all you have left, is the feeling of the world outside.

The first abstract vision of the world we suppose is that : an acoustic image of time and space around, where the point you stare is the centre, the sight. Thus when it is about your hand, the specific structure created is that you cannot only know if the centre here must be you as your attention to the hand, or *you* that is reflected and sent back by the hand - this you that stares and wants and expects.

Then language, the symbol and the mind are only a displacement from the outside look to the inside. Yet the *I* too, has a convex side.

48 In Gilles Deleuze, "Cinéma et pensée cours 90 du 28/05/1985", *La voix de Gilles Deleuze*, Paris 8 University, Saint-Denis, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=138

The Einstein train : Founding Hermeneulogy

[Why we should elaborate a new discipline.]

'La venue du sens et de la référence d'un texte au langage, c'est la venue au langage d'un monde et non la reconnaissance d'une autre personne. [...] Se comprendre en face de ..., en face d'un monde, c'est tout le contraire de se projeter, soi, ses propres croyances et ses propres préjugés ; c'est bien plutôt laisser l'œuvre et son monde élargir l'horizon de la compréhension que je prends de moi-même. [...] Ne sommes-nous pas prêts à reconnaître dans le pouvoir de l'imagination, non plus la faculté de tirer des « images » de notre expérience sensorielle, mais la capacité à laisser de nouveaux mondes façonner la compréhension de nous-mêmes ? Ce pouvoir ne serait pas porté par des images, mais par des significations émergentes dans notre langage. L'imagination, dès lors, serait enfin traitée comme une dimension du langage. De cette manière, un nouveau lien apparaîtrait : entre imagination et métaphore.' Paul Ricœur, « La métaphore et le problème central de l'herméneutique », in *Ecrits et conférences 2 : Herméneutique*, Editions Seuil, coll. La couleur des idées, pp.116-122

In all our work, we have been treating the human experiences conditioned by language as metaphor. As there are very few that are not interpreted through language-based structures, we can allege that as soon as conscious or unconscious judgement occurs in behaviour, the metaphorical power of the human mind is at stake. We justify this metaphorical inscription in the fact that all that is individually experienced is in a way created or recreated by and inside of a personal as well as collective network of meaning and perspective ; and that all that is formed by language is formed in something else's stead that is more primary, amoral and untamable.

According to French philosopher Paul Ricœur, 'if the metaphorical sense is something more and else than the actualisation of one of the potential meanings of a polysemous word (yet all our words in the natural tongues are polysemous), it is necessary that this metaphorical use be only contextual : by that I understand a meaning that emerges as unique and fugitive result of a certain contextual action. [...] The metaphor is such a contextual change of meaning.'⁴⁹

The context here depends on the level we choose to set our interpretation on. Here, we moved the reference of interpretation to the lowest level we could match : from where does and did any possible creation of language come from ? As soon as we understand the context as being the moral context to any conditions for all events into language, we understand that none of its uses are meaningless.

Let us go back to physicist Albert Einstein's theory of relativity. If you are carried by a train, any effort you will produce there will be impacted by the speed of the train you are carried on. Hence, none of your moves will be neutral ; they will all be charged by the inertia of the train, its own gravity.

Then, language and the mind are like the Einstein train : if you don't realise that you are on, you will wonder why it demands effort to move. Here, we put forward that if you don't get to realise that you are carried through by language that is contextual, and that its context is rooted in morals and its long-stead teachings, you will go on wondering why it is so difficult to come by its source and be quiet.

Therefore, as a first result of our work – that you may find in previous articles -, we decided to form a new field of investigation. As it is a network of interpretation of human experience that is

49 *Op. cit.*, p. 99

connected both to a theory of anthropogenesis and the vast corpus of analytical researches (Hermeneutics, Psychoanalysis, Neurobiology, Ethology, Social and Political studies, ...), we come up with the idea that it should in some way prepare itself for an unification that would still be open enough to stay accurate. To stay creative. To keep on being connected to meaning and to the power of signifying through words and other forms of language.

Any of our actions takes place in what Ricœur underlined as a dialectic between a local event and the totality of the ensemble. In a poem or in a myth (as Ricœur refers to Aristotle's idea of *mimèsis*), the unit of the metaphorical phrase gives body to the whole ; but the whole is as well determining the context in which the metaphorical meaning takes way. Same here, action, reaction and interpretation through moral-based values of language and its behaviour give us an *hermeneutic circle* (as we find it in Hans-Georg Gadamer's work).

It is like the sensorimotor value of everything we experience, that *enacts* – in neurobiologist Francisco Varela's way - any of its particular events but taking its shape in the whole of our life span. In an hegelian spirit, we would inspect all the different layers of time, space and moral implications, whose responsibility is taken for what action and at what extent. A clear mind would be one that can grasp the whole poetic nature of the human experience, as we created language as an alternative to self-destructive fascination to the paradoxical hand.

As for our position toward the necessity to give body to this way of interpreting human experience on a large scale and the whole spectrum of language's implications, we wish to found a new discipline. This discipline would be one as meta-Hermeneutics, because of its metaphorical use of the whole mind's structure.

Therefore, we decided to call it Hermeneulogy. As another growing of Hermeneutics's impact, it would have the mission to create a collective network between all the existing fields that are subject to interpretation, in moral, social, scientific and esthetic value.

Believing that time is missing in our ecological and social crisis, we wish to go straight to the point with this vision of intellectual work, creation and duty. Because we have a duty in this world that is confused by the intrications between power, distress and language. This new section of intellectual working is a political commitment to a world, its societies and ecosystems that should be more just, more balanced, more aware of its very humble origins before believing that we should be gods.

The most probable case : the hand paradox and gravity in being human

[This text sets a narrative of the first possible structure for the relation-to-object theory, in an anthropogenealogical perspective.]

Before to begin, we always wonder how the hands are going to take over our decision to do things. What we will start with. How we would be able to go uninterrupted.

As well, as it is to pose the question of our origins, we should always wonder how to begin.

Those who read this may be sensitive to the notions introduced before as to the three paradoxes theory and its implications to the comprehension of the anthropogenesis process. We have merely there posed the question of the conditions of possibility to the genesis of the human mind.

Now it is time to speak of something else, that is of maybe the most probable scenario to the progressive elaboration of the proper relational structures to the objects of the world. Which means : the prime elaboration of the symbolic relations. We are looking for the most probable case, that is of course an approximate narrative.

To do that, we will start back to the beginning that is : a world ruled by gravity. In the natural world, most of what has grown part of the environment is down. That means : rooted to the ground and tending to get back to it. Hence all living things eventually end up holding grip on reality : branches, ground, rock, water, ...

Our ancestors, surely, did the same.

If you could do the same yourself, as a reader, play chimpanzee. Crouch close to the ground with something similar to a rock in your hand. Short-circuit thoughts and be only playing instinctively your part without playing a role. You will realise that close to the ground, your hand will tend to stay shut on the object. It is mainly 'an object in your hand' that you'll see, that merges with all the diversity of other things that you can see on the ground close to you.

You are close to your own body as well, and you can see your hands quite often.

Now if you get up, your feeling will change. Suddenly, there is more distance to the ground. The vertical effect of gravity will pull more inertia on your limbs. If you keep your hands down, you can't see them, as you cannot directly see what is at your feet. If you raise your arms and lift the object in you hand to your sight, something will happen : you may feel the fear of loosing the object if in any way you happened to drop it.

How did it happen ? Because things fall if they are unattached. Yourself would fall if you should loose grip on something to hold on. Except that you have been going on standing up on two feet except of four and progressively, your hands have given up on their function of motor support.

If you don't hold your hands up, they will as well fall, as an effect of gravity.

Yet, two things. One, to hold your hands before your gaze has a peculiar effect on what we called the sensorimotor paradox of the hands : they can't be *at the same time* the object of intention and the vector to reach it. Then it stops the neural chains of instinctual reaction and interaction.

Secondly, the perimeter drawn by the distance from your hands is getting equal to the distance you can bend forward until you start falling. If you are raising your hand open in front of you and you bend your head and the top of your body to it, gravity will start pulling you down to the ground.

Therefore the result of this is that there is a perimeter where you can stand and hold it safe, and another world behind it, beyond the capacity of your hands, where things may fall. Hence the adequation may be made on the symbolic level between the holding of your hands and the holding of the world. A balance between the understanding of what doesn't and keeps from falling in that intimate space of your perimeter for action, and a world beyond what you can't reach that yet doesn't fall either.

The stopping of the interaction with the surroundings creates a radial measure of comparison where you are the centre. You don't need anymore to lean on your environment for motor support, as well as you can't see your own feet supporting you. But you may start thinking that maybe the world around you stands *in the same way* that you are making things stand in that perimeter where you are safe, in stopping your direct interactions with the world.

While you were waiting, you expected that something eventually would fall because you haven't hold a grip on anything and haven't asked for anything to be of that use : you aren't asking anymore. However, maybe, now there is something that you were holding in your hand and prevented from falling, and you realise nothing happened that would have made you fall.

While you are holding the object that you prevent from dropping to the ground, you are holding your breath, and yet it is certain that nothing fell much more.

What if then you did not just put back the thing you held, maybe a small rock, on the ground where you found it, but lifted your arm to put it on something else, maybe a taller rock, maybe a rock your size, a stone ? This is something a primate would do, to put an object on another object. Except that here, you would have a purpose : will that rock stand on another rock ? Or will it fall ?

You are checking balance. You are verifying that this works the same as you. Something on another thing *stands*. And then you enter a system of coordinates, of comparison, of scientific observation, of understanding from artificial conditions that you created.

It doesn't have to be more sophisticated than that, and even children do the the same. But look how delicate, how fine it is. We haven't done much more : this thing that I put on another thing, will it stand, or will it fall ? What a most perfect image of metaphor, of contextual *mimèsis*. Two registers : me, my feeling, my body and the world ; the other, the unmoving object, an object that I took, a coming together that stays together and stands.

It stays together and it stands. Those two things were not bound to be put together to begin with. One was on the ground, the other was already standing from it, but I could merge them together into one single reality that is a fragile and delicate balance, because all things fall eventually. If it is up, in some way it is alive. If it is down and stays down on the ground, in some way I can interpret that it is dead. But so is the order of things.

Relational expectation to objects tells that I expect from some objects I project my intention with that they could be dead, inert, or that they could possibly be alive. Aesthetic sense was most certainly born with the intimate correlation that if things stand like my standing *inert* - because I am and I feel inert when I stand, most especially when I stand looking at my own hand's paradoxical feeling - means nevertheless that I am alive, maybe they should in some way be alive too. Maybe I should expect them to be alive if they look like standing. A shadow play.

Objects probably turned symbolic because of that. How could I stand that my standing in

solitude - because verticality is a solitude, as a distance to the things on the ground as well as to the remote things all around - should mean that there is only me and my hands and what they take ? No, I cannot do otherwise but doubling my perspectives.

When I stare at my hand, as a focal relational point, perception of the background is still there and continues to exist. The paradox is that I feel more intensely the effects of gravity and pressure on my body, because of the stopping of my reliance on the surroundings - like in a mirror effect where I can't rely on the image it sends to seek motor support -, and then the surroundings around are under the threat of collapsing.

My intentional force will become a standing point that only can assure that the world around will stand. I, in fact, have to let go of the grip on reality to grant myself with support. I relate that my only intentional force can assure *me* that the world around will stand, and I can verify, after the delay of my fear and anxiety that it would not, that it has indeed kept on standing, that it didn't fall.

Therefore the world is *alive*. And that means that it is alive as a doubled perspective and extended vision of my own potential world for action and its measure. The stability of the world around is then made of a radial quality that the subject resists to gravity by the effort of maintaining a vertical balance. They stop relying totally on sensorimotor interactional support and then find emotional support and reassurance from objects remotely.

The perimeter described by the hand paradox makes it what we could physiologically call a *scalar radiation stop*, because it gives the measure of an incompressible volume in which a vacuum is made - things from my heights *fall* - and beyond which I can only prevent the other things from falling. Therefore it creates a force of inertia that is connected to the influence of the gravitational field of the ground, that pulls pressure on the local point where the individual is standing. They are literally sucked up by gravity, but at the same time, the individual standing makes sure that the world can be without them if they only want it to.

The identity of the object, its volume for interaction and symbolic consideration - *con sidere*, 'with the stars' - is created *because I want to see if the world is standing*, or if it is only me trying.

We are raising things up so they could be at our stand, in a state of balance, ready to fall, but *not quite*. An approximation, and the force of the metaphor, the paradox of thinking, of language, of signifying, is not much the perfection of reaching the immanent nature of reality, but of getting close enough to it so we could, us too, know that we stand, and are only trying to keep balance, so we would not happen to fall ever again.

Hermeneulogy

Hermeneulogy - I - First moment : causal associative chains

[Pushing forward new analytical objects to the workings of the mind.]

We are now entering a new phase of our developments that would be the setting of the foundations and conceptual territory of Hermeneulogy. As precedently announced, this field would have for object a cross-disciplinary approach to the structures of the human mind, seen as sensorimotor and symbolic. This field then summons a network of various domains of investigation, such as Hermeneutics, Psychoanalysis, Neurobiology and Ethology.

Two distinct yet complementary perspectives are subject to investigation : the phylogenic process of anthropogenesis (for which the theory of the three paradoxes has been thoroughly presented) ; and the ontogenic process of the formation of the human mind as experienced by the individuals at the present moment of our species's evolution.

Our first session here will introduce the first cross-topological concept of *causal associative chains*. Beyond the opposition induced between causal and associative learning - one that would be immanent and rational logic, the other including the subjective association of exogenous events by the individual -, we wish to express here the way each one is weaving its relation to the other.

For which demonstration we first put to test the peculiar object of metaphor, as a disruptive association in the logical structure, yet creating a new level for causality. Reality is then read as contextual, and the kind of reality the aesthetics level uses is not that far from concrete reality when you enter a mythical construction of causal relations.

As for the theory of the three paradoxes, it has much to do with the bipolarity of the body-rooted perception of self-action. It occurs in the network of meanings that has been built on the paradoxical measure given to the subject's personal and relational input. The *delay or lag* created by the sensorimotor paradox of gazing one's own hand created the distance for meaningful action and its semantics.

The intentional sensorimotor vector we named *seize-wish* mentions that the neural value of the activity of the hands is not neutral. Hands seize and the founding paradox of the gazed hand provoked, we believe, a radical split between what is inside of my relational mediation to the hands and what is outside of it. The hands create common objects between the world and I.

Then, the inside of the hands would tend to be associated and identified with the objects from which they put distance to the body - for instance, when one bipedal being falls forward because of gravity : distance from the ground. Becoming biped displaced the centre of the body from the middle to a position a bit forward, at a little distance from the body itself - and a proper yet precarious balance.

The outside of the hands would on their side tend to be associated with the integrity of the body, the exterior shell that can be hurt and damaged. This bipolar dynamics inside/outside, open/close, standing/falling, breathing in/breathing out, naming/perceiving, can be described as causal associative chains connecting relational *slight traumas*. Namely, the receiving of a sensory perception of reality, a mark and neural imprint, and our responding to it.

The perception of volumes would be for instance intimately related to the abstraction from the self's projection - distance - in the reception of still and moving objects perceived as *identities*, and therefore as detached forms from the subject. Causal associative chains aim at the articulation that the subject operates to convey personal enaction into the relational expectations to their

experiential semantic fields. The convexity of the objects then creates the notions of time and space necessary to locate them in the personal world of the subject and their modalities of perception.

Ruptures in these chains, as we will see, do not mean a rupture in the capacity of the subject to leap over to the next step into their own mythical and metaphorical causal associations. The rupture in logic presents in the metaphor an invitation for the subject to leap over these semantic and syntactic gaps, in order to create new contextual meaning.

Drops of sweat, drops of tears

In the 1985 Chinese film 'The Boarding House of Regrets', by female director Hu Mei, we witness some interesting moments, in spite of some monotonous parts. During the Cultural Revolution, a 15 year old girl named Qiao Xiaoyu is sent as a nurse to a military hospital in the middle of the mountains.

The order is strict there and personal afflictions or sentimental feelings are highly discouraged. Yet the young girl falls in love with a wounded captain, stirring her mind away from work, with very few words. Dead in the water, this love story will become the melancholic essence to the poetics of the film. From there, 15 another years pass before she marries and decides to turn a new page.

What is really striking in this film is the presence of water. More precisely, the close shots on the faces when the main characters sweat - when witnessing gross surgery or removing a painful bandage in an intimate moment between the girl and the boy. This materialisation of sweat becomes an entire aesthetic object in those shots, the poetics of those metaphorical objects. Thus, it appears as though the body through the skin was shedding tears. And then, it turns to another passage with a close shot on Qiao's tear-bathed eyes.

In absence of words, the pain striking from regimented actions leaves no other choice to the body than to find another way to tell, to show outside of it what is happening on the inside.

Then, the separation scene between the lovers is only marked by those hesitating words : 'You... I... We...', the look of Qiao away from the soldier and suddenly - a rupture in causality - the image of the bus driving him away from her on dusty road. Metaphor was here, where we were expecting for a causal return to the face of the loved one ; it drove directly, it cut off and patched up to the feeling of separation, of loss, of being torn apart from something dear.

Later, the tears become the rain, and the rain, a child giving transparent marbles to the nurse he admires, 15 years after she renounced writing back to the captain. And later on, another image, a two or three year old boy in the arms of her mother, a friend of Qiao's, in an apartment, and the same little boy tearing the page of a magazine in the same way that Qiao had torn the envelope - with the adress of the soldier - that she mended and stuck in her diary.

To finish with, the snow and the page of the notebook torn into small pieces, blown in the wind.

In all that, you can see the symbolical logic of the humours of the body, organic and ecological poetics. But the most important feature is that if the associative causality of the metaphor turns accurate on the aesthetic level, what does it tell us of the subject's contextual reading ? Is the metaphorical causality written on an arbitrary and logical text, or does the subject create the conditions in which the unnamed poetics of those images would emerge ?

Then, what does it tell us about the interpretation of reality ? What does count as pure causality (even if you can doubt the very existence of matter like René Descartes did in his time) and what can be put on the account of the relativity of our personal subjective perception ?

More importantly, where does meaning appear as meaning and not only as the habit of holding things as being meaningful to us ? To be more precise, how much is our relation to causality imprinted in the personal associative experience we made it something meaningful from ? How does the semantics of experience become so entangled that the sensorimotor and the symbolic level are almost impossible to dissociate ?

All those questions stress why the concept of causal associative chains seems relevant to us in order to bring out some crosspath objects that would help us create new relations between those plans.

Causality and distance

When *I* think that I know that an event *a* will provoke another that would be the event *b* as a consequence, I do not only infer that it will be so everytime the adequate conditions will be gathered for it. If I say : 'This marble is going to fall from the train window to the ground, and every marble of equivalent size and weight will', I not only say that it *will* surely do ; but I also suppose that the reality I associate myself with is stable. That means, not that causality is relative, but that the distance from the objects I observe is relative to my being sure of its being related to *me*.

If I say : 'This book is put on the table, and it is not going to move', inevitably, even unconscious, another voice would respond : 'Is it ?' Because in fact, we can expect everything from reality, as soon as a meaningful affirmation implies the confidence in the stability of our own experience - all that is learnt from childhood. It is not reality that is doubtful, it is us as an emerging structure of experience - of the others, language and ourselves. Therefore, we have to check everytime that what we hold for a stable reality - that is *for us* - is really something meant for us at all. Am I really part of this reality ? Am I included ? Isn't the self a proof that there is a difference between the world and I ? How am I enough different to be some piece of an identity ? And how am I different from my thoughts of myself ?

In fact, metaphor is everywhere language forms our relation to reality, because our relation to reality is based on unachieved reality.

Let us go back to the paradox of the gazed hand. If I could have swallowed my own hand, I may have achieved a potential reality : *I turn my hand into an object of intentional projection and then the next logical step is that I eat and swallow my hand*, that I assimilate it. Yet the hand is the very outside object that I *can't* assimilate. It is a blocker to circling reality. And it is sensorimotor, that is why it is so powerful.

Hence, this is also why the *id* of psychoanalysis always feeds itself, restlessly, and nurtures the drive for the conscious to self-maintain its own contextual stream of conscious. The context of thinking is not what I want to do, it is observing the logics of what I am going to do.

Psychoanalyst Darian Leader observed wonderfully how the hands expressed the disruptions in the continuity of the self. When chains of the causal associations of the conscious's activity are tight, it is working and it is self-coherent. It creates its own context for meaning, it is dense and intense. But when it gets loose or finds inherent contradictions with inhibiting gaps in its semantics, blank spots where the function of the thinking annuls, the reference for meaning collapses ; and at this moment, the hands are the most direct testimony left of our social and moral existence to the common world.

So there is of course always a distance created between the social norms, those cultural networks of meaning and the inside workings of the mind. But every now and then, this fabric of

the moral context meets cracks and then we can only witness the outside persistence - or not - of our common automatic, unconscious behaviour amongst the others.

There is a constant dialogue between what we propose as statement to the reality we expect a confirmative response from, and the insecurity that it will - maybe not. There are always two sides to the hands : the inside that is in some way related to the self, action, seizure and the control of distance ; the outside to the others, to the unknown and never certain capacity to relate to them.

Therefore, we can only associate together that if one reality is certain because I act within it, the other is uncertain because I may get hurt because of it. Causality is thus always associative because it has to include that if the reality I describe and find causality in does not prove me right, it may not only prove me wrong on this point ; I may have to face a difficult disruption in the integrity and fabric of the reality I perceived as valid for a legitimate contextual action up to this moment.

The semantics of action is based on the fabric of what I hold as favourably responding to my assertions on reality. Reality has a phenomenological volume when it is potential and possibly moving. As soon as I plan to act toward it, it only recovers the properties that make it edible or not, that make it *still*.

Reality, because of language, because of distance and because of the bipolarity of its paradoxical conditions, is always a resistance - therefore *radial* - because it needs a reliable distance to be either true or false. Reality needs to be moving to have volume, time, space. Either way, we don't have a choice, by nature : as soon as we assert something on reality, we are only stressing the metaphorical nature of our relation to language - that is our prime intermediary to reality, a reality for action - out. We live to eat, and language helps us explain why we want to eat some things that we *cannot* without hurting ourselves. That is why the root of the human mind is a moral root.

We propose the concept of causal associative chains to express that anytime we make a connection between two events - between drops of sweat and tears -, sequencing reality into chains of action, we are only trying to get closer to the very property that makes us keep a distance from a difficult outcome. If I bite my own hand and try to swallow it, I will hurt myself. If I fall forward on the ground without raising my hands open to stop it and protect my body, I will get hurt.

If I don't put a word between myself and the other that comes towards me and that is yet just a confused form, just a convex event in the fabric of reality, I will never get to know them and place a common object to be convex in our stead between them and I.

That is the elementary function of articulating the three levels of our experience - physiological, relational, symbolic - together with adequate cross-concepts that allow us move more freely and in a more fluid way beyond all the metaphorical fields of our wonderments. All those notions we will precise in our ongoing work on Hermeneutological investigation.

Hermeneutology - II - From the most probable case to psychoanalysis

[Applications of the concepts to psychoanalysis theory and practice. First redefinition of the trauma.]

We exposed in an article called *The most probable case* what we considered being the most probable scenario for the constitution of the symbolical capacities in the evolution of the human species. As we are talking of the symbolic, we wondered what consequences this theory could have on the practice and theory of psychoanalysis.

There we may redefine the symbolic as : 1) *primitively, the experience that something could hold and stand with or over something else preventing, not provoking or slowing down its fall and collapsing (for example, a rock in balance over another rock) ; 2) the relation made between two separate events made participant of a third one, creating contextual meaning ; 3) thus, the familiarity created between those events ; 4) the fact that I recognise the chain relating them one to another as a separate object appearing beyond those events ; 5) the capacity to recognise the identity of the chain (cf causal-associative chain) before even to consider the events themselves ; 6) at last, the fact that I associate to me the capacity to create familiarity amongst these relations between objects, the capacity to make them a property of me.*

What is important in this redefinition ? First, the inclusion of a sensorimotor origin to the symbolical capacities. I explore the capacity for things to stand in balance by themselves in arbitrary conditions. Here, the important is not that things could stand up in nature like trees, but that things that are usually down on the ground, inert, could also stand up *on something else* if I made them do.

In today's state of culture it is quite natural because we live in an artificial environment where most of the objects surrounding us are standing up over something else. An object left on the ground would be identified as an object misplaced. So the important is to measure that this distinction between objects on the ground and objects *up* had to be made in the first place.

Because here again, it is a matter of delay. If you are putting an object over another object taller, creating more distance from it to the ground, you are again creating a delay. A delay in its falling back down. The very thing the hand paradox and bipedal stand made us enjoy the most, is observing a delay on things usually being another way.

Hence one of the major consequences for psychoanalysis, is that the analysts and analysed, should they be on one side or the other of the bipolarity "doctor-patient", locate themselves *in those laps* of delayed consequences for potential and symbolical acts. If I fear that things would fall and break, shatter on the ground, by fear of realising that I allowed myself to fear my own collapsing, it is most likely that I would have created the means for a delay in this possible collapsing - at least in its clear and unequivocal manifestation to the others and to myself.

So it is important in analysis that we get to observe the same thing, that is not much the object of resistance itself, that might be different both for the patient and the analyst, but that delayed space where precisely room is made for the symbolic. Because we observe that the abstraction of the relation - relation that makes my expectation an *identity* of my relation to reality - between events allows us to create an imaginary delay to their concrete manifestation and consequences.

So manifesting the structure of the symbolical delay of traumatic events we fear is at the

core of the work in analysis. Moreover the sensorimotor definition of *trauma*⁵⁰ as an anticipation of the result from a chain of events (the rock that I put on a taller rock *is going to fall*), allows us to say that the structure of resistance in analysis is deeply rooted in the certitude *that it will* in fact happen that way. We see the *trauma* as something, whatever scale or degree, that induces significative change in the ontogenic disposition of the individual to life.

Trauma can be a *slight trauma*, some event that may not appear like the definition of something traumatic, injuring severely the physical or psychological integrity of the person. But even the biological modification of the organism in its interactions with its environment is part of the whole mass that is the *trauma* (you could even wonder about its similarity with the German word for "dream" that is *Traum*). The impact of the taste of a fruit can be a *trauma*. A great joy can be part of a *trauma*. The imprint of a color can be part of a *trauma*. The *trauma* is progressive and it

⁵⁰ The trauma isn't the shock causing the trauma. It is the memory of the shock, the imprint on the neural system, psyche, the skin, flesh, the body. Trauma is the wound, but not exactly the open and fresh wound. It is already something that happened. Because when you're hurt badly for extreme instance, the brain will shut down the feeling of pain. It is then the moment after that you are in pain, the scarring over that hurts in the long run.

But look at the etymology : "1690s, "physical wound," medical Latin, from Greek *trauma* "a wound, a hurt; a defeat," from PIE **trau-*, extended form of root **tere-* (1) "to rub, turn," with derivatives referring to twisting, piercing, etc. Sense of "psychic wound, unpleasant experience which causes abnormal stress" is from 1894." (from Etymonline) It is interesting that it could even mean "defeat", which underlines the retrospective and transgressive nature of the word. Its contextual nature, related to some perspective larger than the instantaneous shock. It is progressive.

The trauma takes place and is maintained over time. In fact, while you are scarring over the wound, your life doesn't cease. There is no trauma if the life of the person doesn't continue, if you aren't feeling the pain or a slighter physiological imprint on your body memory. You can only notice and witness the wound. On the contrary, you are much more committed to the shock, because you can still respond to it at the moment it happens, try to avoid it immediately.

But when you're hurt, when you are wounded, what do you fear the most ? Most of the time, that something would reawaken the pain. When you are on your hospital bed, you are struggling and seeking strategies to prevent the pain from coming back. You are, properly, anticipating that you would feel pain from the trauma again. It is extended and gives as well a certain way to measure the time you would be safe from it. You may even extend and distil the expression of your pain so you would delay your confronting it again.

So in fact, no, you can't anticipate the traumatic event, but the perception and the symbolic quality of the trauma is something that has a vibration, a wavelength. It is like an earthquake, you can't anticipate the event, but you always anticipate the outcome, the extent of the damage, and you're trying to forecast the aftermath.

This is, but of course it can be debated, the structure of trauma. It is something very much personal, you hold on your trauma, because it defines you, you're working over it. Your whole life narrative becomes a scar tissue of it. In fact, you accompany it and you anticipate everything in your life that could bring it back. You can even love and expect a great deal about life because of a trauma.

And also the trauma is always the reactivation of an ancient pain, that would make you fear not only the coming back of the pain, but the destruction of the self. So it gets structural. It is much about the fear of not knowing whether we could stop the sinking of pain or not, how bad it would be.

Trauma has a slope, it is unfathomable and you can't see the bottom of it. So in fact, you anticipate everything out of trauma. The latter then doesn't mean the only technical way by which the wound has been made (either sliced, cut, pierced or crushed). It only means that *it has been done*. And so it has been done, it can happen again. It belongs to the history of the subject. And therefore, the trauma anticipates the outcome of patterned, recognisable events. Otherwise it becomes another wound, another pattern, another trauma.

Think of Twin Peaks, by David Lynch, there is this scene in the season 2 when Maddy is killed and the Giant appears to Agent Dale Cooper on the stage at the bar, to say : "It is happening again... It is happening again." See, trauma, like Twin Peaks's, functions as an echoe of pain.

is what transgresses the actual equilibrium of the subject, that puts it at the stake of what is going to happen next.

It is manifest to the subject that the structure of the trauma is causal, though we know it is associative. So we have the symbolic nature of causality, put over the associative character of its being related to a way of anticipating and delaying the manifestation of the traumatic event. The latter is then seen as a logical consequence of my association with a reality that I anticipate.

It *should* be that way, but I have no guarantee that it would in fact be that way. The rock on the stone could fall or stand, but I never know that it would. I can never be sure, and that is in that space for approximation that expectation begins. And in that expectation, the conscious of diverse possibilities. And in those potential outcomes, the hope for the one that would mean that things won't ever fall where I should redo everything all over again.

Work starts here where I have to pick the rock up again and try gravity a second time, and then as many times again until I have succeeded in making this reality that I want to stand.

The fact that I try something doesn't mean that I should succeed, and it can be quite painful to see a rock fall to the ground from a taller rock, fearing the shock. It is like me falling from my own heights without the hands open to create a distance or a delay from the ground. There is a reduction of my perspectives.

If I expect the rock to stand my size over another rock, I focus on the wish that my perspective to this room open for a development of action would stand as well in integrity. Except that if the rock falls and can't stand in balance, this space, room and measure for action annuls, is abolished by gravity.

If things can stand higher from the ground where they use to be, that means a lot of other possibilities than my standing to the ground. Maybe there is something higher, freed from gravity. If things can *stand* without holding grip, like magic, with the only force of my trying to make them do, imagine the possibilities.

I can make things stand and delay the effects gravity has on me and them. Even at an age (should it be the prehistorical Age or the young age) where the concept of gravity is not conscious and formalised as a whole, the statement and consciousness that *things fall* is quite quickly related, as a reference to me playing with the falling objects or to *me* realising that I have a power on them.

In analysis, it leads to a second major consequence : is the common intentional force driven around the common object of delay strong enough to prevent the subject from collapsing ? Which means : if the subject is seized in a context (social, moral, cultural context) where they are themselves put in delay because the context pushes them to be responsible immediately of a certain behaviour, what is the strongest force on them ?

To be more precise, in a society or model of society where the collapsing of collective and intermediary structures (social, economical, ecological, ...) is anticipated and included in the logical causality of its progress, how could the individuals resist this planned collapsing ? And how could psychoanalysis open for other ways and other moral entities to show responsible of (local solidarity, global consciousness of the ecosystems, economical, social and moral resilience, ...) ?

These are large scales that we may assume psychoanalysis only cannot solve, and of course not, it has to connect with the other fields structuring the symbolical meta-form of Culture. By the way, it may seem a bit dated, but Hegel's philosophy of History has interests to be reminded of ; and one is the necessity to observe the symbolical structure of Culture as a whole nurtured and captured by the individuals' relational and imaginary world of perspective, landscape for action.

So what perspective has psychoanalysis to be responsible for ? We say, it has to be responsible for this object : the delay put and hold on what is going to happen to the subject. You would have to suspend time in the subject's expectation so that the structure of this expectation would show and be revealed to the subject themselves.

The resistances and the mechanisms of transfer don't have other purpose than of holding time on the intrication of what the subject holds as a forecast consequence to every action and the fact that they are held themselves by the structures of the social and moral debts on a larger scale. You would work from the particle to the cell, atom and molecule of Culture, that is in crisis : the individual, the family, the closest social surroundings, the larger cultural, social and political network, the geopolitical issues, the biosphere scale.

All that are symbolical imageries standing over our heads and lives. And as well as we fear their collapsing, we allow them to stand this way. Though we should recognise the ability from the subject to stand these objects, and allow them to get some more clarity on *why they are doing that*.

Then, the first question, what has anthropogenesis theory to do with psychoanalysis ? I would say because as psychoanalysts, we would occupy a first choice place to witness those intrications, and to try to push forward to disentangling them. We too oppose resistance. Because as we should remember, the subject, as well as we, tries to eat, to assimilate reality to their symbolical comprehension and adaptation to what is coming.

When *I* make a rock stand on another rock, I am making the small rock be ; but I am also making the larger rock *bear*. And as the larger rock bears, I am the bearing one. I am holding the co-relation between two willing symbolical entities : the one that bears, and the one that stands.

See, the work is rather unequal. The one is serving the other. the one is making the other stand. There is an inert force that is making a mobile force be *still*. What else makes a mobile force be still by bearing them ? The subject with the symbolic. Metaphor.

Then we, as analysts, should never focus that much on the small rocks that is the standing mobility, that eventually *will* fall, as on the larger one that is keeping quiet and still to make *the other* stand.

Which means, when we are working on the symbolic, we are in fact keeping the attention on the balance put on this structure and its relation to the subject. Yet the symbolic is merely prevented from falling to the ground. The first nature of the symbolic is in its collapsing. We have to hold it with context otherwise it should not exist and be alive.

This context is provided by the subject as a cultural person, who has been raised and brought up by making them as tall as a world of artificially standing objects is. Allow the latter to fall, and you will see the subject naked. We have indeed a subversive work to do. Break the standing objects.


What would you do if you were only left standing without a rock to bear ?

Hermeneulogy - III - The end of the subject

[Introducing the untied point concept to the structure of the mind.]

Let us consider the mind as a structure. This structure is made out of localities (points) and relations (lines). This is then a topological representation of the mind where the experiential memories are relating to each other through the categories and relations of language, structuring the relationship with reality.

This would be such a representation :



Part of the structure is closed and rigidified by the process of integration to the sensorimotor as well as by the resistances. It is in fact for this reason that the resistances are difficult to find in psychoanalysis ; because of their assimilation to the inner structures of behaviour. That is why we use a very large definition of *trauma* as part of the ontogenic learning that would include all the *slight traumas* that often go unnoticed ; that are simply part of the sustained imprint and mark of the broad environment on the sensorimotor, as well as the moral events encountered by the subject.

The *slight traumas* as much as the large *traumas* create those points, those localities, significant memory imprints. They leave a mark that makes the territory of the subject coordinated, structured by familiar events that became part of their identities.

This is the topology of the mind.

About trauma

We propose a modelling image, a representation for the topology of the trauma : Take the crashing of an asteroid. You could identify two objects : one still, the land, that you would expect to be still, that you would anticipate that it stay ; and a mobile one, the asteroid, which you did not expect nor anticipated at this moment.

For the moment, they are two objects, distinct from each other, with clean identities of their own. Then there is the impact : it *has happened* eventually. But at this other moment, it is already something else, a third object, the crash. And in the crash, the two original objects merge together.

Like plunging into water, the asteroid disappears and becomes the crash. And then after the crash, after the shockwave caused by but distinct from the impact, what only remains is : the crater. So it is a cycle of transformation. And a transfer of identity.

You don't fear the asteroid when it has crashed. You fear the consequences of the impact. But with the impact you cannot work. You have to wait after the shockwave and then, work with the memory of an event you could even not remember the origin and cause of. People can witness the crater without remembering nor knowing what provoked it. Yet the land is hurt, fragilised, vibrates differently. At least it has changed the way we walk the land, the way we see it, identify it, relate to it, tell stories about it, legends... It creates a new territory for action.

Therefore you could draw the structure of the trauma as being a vast form separate from the point of impact which it did come from, but that was belonging to another identity. It is the meeting of the asteroid and the land in certain conditions that created the shock, and then the mark of the trauma ; which is another identity.

Only the impact is invariant whatever the objects, but you cannot relate to it because it is an action provoked by the meeting of two or more separate identities and entities. You cannot relate to something that is already a relation, but to the common object of the relation. Here, there is no object in-between and that is the shock, the direct shock and crashing of two objects for which there was no object in-between to separate and relate them. It was pure relation without object, and so it created a shock, a magnetic shock, that excluded everything else but the consciousnessless meeting. A deadly shock to survive from.

The shock is consciousnessless because there is no object. So there is a trauma afterward, because you have to recreate meaning, relation, from a desert, a crater then, nothing. -

In fact, the result of the shock is the object, that is a trauma. Yet it has become so entangled with the rest of the form that structures the identity of the subject that one sole movement of the traumatic point would generate movement on the rest of the structure. And as the relations have rigidified in time, the movement from the trauma would create torsions. Pain.

Because the body tends to reinforce the wounded regions. A broken bone becomes harder after healing. Except that the particularity of some wounds is that they would heal more slowly and stay open. The reason for that is the rigidification of the structure around the wound.

The shock creates a state of stupefaction and rejection of the alien part cast on the identity of the subject. The moment of the impact creating the trauma stops time, makes a snap photograph of the moment that has been petrified. There is this moment of sideration of pain that fractures the former settings of time, the way we thought that we could still inhabit its notion.

Freud called it the dread⁵¹, that is something you were not prepared to face. It is a condensation point in the perception of time, a singularity (to borrow from physicist Roger Penrose). Then comes the anguish, that is the workings of trauma, almost in an expressionist way. It exacerbates the sense of the event. It is a bit like early XXth composer Arnold Schoenberg's paintings.

There is an induced paranoia in trauma that is not much about the subject as it is about the topology itself. The curve of the trauma. The subject is merely making choices among possibilities offered by the context. The trauma is a fracture in the space and time occupied by the subject in the moral structure. And that is why it can be related by the subject to something outside of them eventually, like in psychosis. The wound becomes eventually something on them, like a mark on the skin.

As well, if I feel like my body is going to shatter in thousand pieces, isn't that the mark of something alien on me ? If in the traumatic shock the outside object fuses with the inside of the identity, isn't the monstrosity that the other has gotten so well on me that it cannot be separated from myself, always monstrated ?

If my face is burnt, my identity is changed, I am a manifestation of the trauma that is, in fact, a trauma for all, a trauma in History, a fracture in the transmitted narrative.

At the centenary of the end of World War I, we saw again these images of the "gueules cassées". At the moment of the shock, the trauma did not exist yet. It started to exist when they realised what had become of their face. The image of who and what you are, more than physical pain, has to do with the trauma. Because it shuts ways down. It closes your life's perspectives, narrows it critically and forces you to change what was planned for you to do. You have to make decisions and live, or not make decisions and spiritually die.

Therefore, the most important in trauma is topology. Because it is about what happens next, what is going to cure the trauma, what is going to become of the monster. The *Elephant man* is also such an example of trauma in and of society. It deforms society's image. It creates a new landscape, a discordance.

Most people hide the trauma and suffer a great deal living in fear ; others decide to change the reality they are living with, demanding a dignity for it, even when facing the brutality of rejection. This is a choice we make or not. We live the trauma in different ways. Yet in the first impact, there was the only perspective of life or death.

In the end, the trauma only deals with living people.

Topology and untied points

Yet, all those traumatic points are attached to the sensorimotor reliability. They are responsive to the sensorimotricity of behaviour, and that is why the resistances are making the subject so confused. They become uncertain whether they are doing this because they want it or because of an uncontrolled impulse.

In fact, the resistance has meaning because of the trauma, because of the local context, but one resistance cannot lead us to one exact trauma. In Mathematics, you would call that a surjection : when an application from an ensemble F to one G gives for result $f(x) = y$ in G , there are several possible arguments and origins as for the x in F .

Same thing in Thermodynamics, as reminded by Roger Penrose in *The Road to Reality*, for two systems of equivalent temperature connected together, it is almost impossible to predict which

⁵¹ In *Beyond the pleasure principle* (1922).

one would influence the other. You could not "*retrodict*" so easily the second law of Thermodynamics that states generally that the hotter will transfer its calorific energy to the colder. This way is predictable ; not the other.

As well, for one manifestation of a resistance in analysis, you would find an infinity of possibilities as for the trauma that generates it.

In order to come closer to it, you would have to separate the *slight* traumas entangled to it from the larger traumas. You would have to eliminate probabilities, even created as a fiction, in order to clear the visibility on the fundamental structure of the self, bound by language and representation.


Yet there is a very specific type of point that may be useful and come in handy in order to have more clarity on this structure. It is one we would call an *untied point*.

This untied point belongs entirely to the representation out of language. If we take Penrose's idea of the boxes that would be used to mark out the general macroscopic movements and evolution of a chaotic system, this point is the particle getting out of all the boxes. It is the representation of the abstraction itself : abstraction from the structure. In fact, it allows us to explore and "visit" the end of the subject, beyond its boundaries.

There are moments, like those of shock creating the traumas, where the structure is cast away, *forgotten*, as we forget how to use it to recreate structure. At this moment, there is still a sensorimotor inscription, unless the body ends up collapsing as well. But this inscription is expelled from the structure and becomes untied.

It is literally a point floating in an abstract space without a feeling of gravity but its own inertia, in a rectilinear and uniform movement into the void.

We would represent it that way :



The relation is loose, as the ones that would reach a new point without yet a relation. Except that the relation here is abandoned. And the structure is cast away, turned useless. The subject gives away the structure to an elementary exploration of their own void.

In fact, they are merely getting back to the first paradox : the hand paradox, the fascination for inertia, the psychotic origins of the mind, belonging to an inert thing out of the self.

Why is it so important to consider this topology ? Because in analysis, we expect the subject to reconsider the organisation of their own self's structure. To localise the large traumas from the slight traumas is supposed to help them making the wound cleared off from the rigidity induced by the flashed topology of the trauma around it. We only help them bear again the generation of new relations that would take place after the trauma has started scarring over *enough* to continue with flexibility, to support new relations.

It is important that the subject accept that they can get off of their self without losing it completely. That is why they may depend on the analyst a great deal, "to excess". We may not suggest that they should practice this representation but we may ourselves be aware of that settings.

A life without language is possible. A life without the organisation of language does exist everyday in our living with trauma. The fact that we can artificially represent an untied point that we would attach our mind on to travel out of the structure into the void doesn't mean that it does not happen naturally on a daily basis. Except that it is fragmented into the daily use of the mind, maintained over its structure in the habits of language.

However we can project that our own mind structure doesn't entirely belong to us, and that is why it is so difficult to live with when it is ruled by the movings of the trauma.

Identity is necessarily fractured, angular. To begin with, when first born, there is only an untied locality ; that is the sensorimotor inscription. But then the paradoxical condition of the mind doubles it and creates a second untied locality that would take up from the other. The first one creates relations and gets attached. The other one loses itself among the structure. It is forgotten and disregarded. Nevertheless, it is the mirror of the mind.

Then if we manage to forget about and discard the structure one moment that is secured, to give way to this untied point that is precious, because it is the reminiscence of the prime distance to reality created by the mind, we would allow ourselves freedom, and the possibility to recover a soothing voice of our own.

The voice, our voice as well as the voices inside of us, reactivating our memory through language, is what comes out of us that is invisible, almost intangible, impalpable. To make identity stand, we make ourselves believe that the voice is only a part of a global image, that gets confused because of that.

If we make the subject accept that there are things that are inside of them but don't belong to them - the trauma doesn't belong to their doing but has a healing power of itself that only we hinder -, maybe we can reach the point where there don't have to be so many resistances for so few alien traumas. To allow the subject to separate from their own structure as something quite natural and purely speculative, maybe we can help them separate from the traumas as well.


They would still be here, but they would not need that much of a resistance for protecting the structure of the subject from collapsing. This structure has often grown relations out of an impact in hurry and sideration. They still vibrate from the shock.

By taking the subject to their end, beyond the boundaries of structure, maybe they could realise this is, as well, a reliable object that could be used.

Hermeneutology - IV - Mind topology and structure

[Elaborating the topological structuration of the mind.]

We aim here at describing globally the functioning and structuring of the mind of the individual through the ages of life and layers of sollicitation (from the mere sensorimotor to the highly symbolical insights).



The structure is rooted in its origin O. It is then mainly a vectorial structure with remarkable points : Relay Points concentrating various relational ties and redirecting to others ; a Tensor which is the resistance relay, so the converging point of inertia, concentrating effort and susceptible to be *untied* ; the structure's Centre of Gravity, where the state of balance between sensorimotor, affective and symbolical in- and outcomes find common and gathering ground ; Critical Extremities that are subject to isolation from the structure, they are the blind spots of memory ; and the aim of Symbolic Insight, which drives the structure beyond its own limitations. It concentrates the Mind Drive, which we would address later on.

So far in this model, we did not discriminate the Relay Points. Some may be slight traumas, other larger traumas. Some may be connecting the symbolical issues to the parent figures, the body, the social encounters, the fascination for the object, the thrill of creation or the dread of something horrifying. But that is the large canvas where we could sketch, observe, contemplate, dwell on and organise, think and feel about the topology and volume of the three-parted organisation between sensorimotoricity, relational aspects and symbolic developments altogether.

The structure has then been divided in three permeable layers, linked to neurobiologist Jaak Panksepp's classification (see Three paradoxes theory - Part 2) : the Basic-Primordial Affective States (physiological), the Secondary-Process Affective Memories (relational) and the Tertiary Affects and Neocortical 'Awareness' Functions. Far from being a restrictive and strict division, it is more a general setting of how all the aspects of human experience are entangled up together in a same body, brain, environment and relational experience.

As for the practice of analysis, we think it could be a valuable asset in order to keep a clear vision of those intrications. We could not pretend to an exhaustive description and in fact *must not* pretend to it. It is merely a guide and aid to a more global approach of the psyche's movements and connections that reveal both the capacities and the resistances of the subject.

The three Principles of Structural Anthropogenesis

We would like to introduce here as well the Three principles of Structural Anthropogenesis, that would be completed by the Principle of attention (or vigilance) in a fluid environment. The three principles of the creation of the paradoxical and relational structure of the mind-to-objects are the subsequent :

1) Principle of uniformity : due to the sensorimotor paradox, the muting of the chant of breathing and the acute sensation of being bathed in a pressured fluid (the *untied point's* support). The entropy of the blocking paradox makes it difficult to stand but it still is sustained in memory as a trauma-typed experience ; means that it can come back and provokes a form of anxiety.

2) Middle principle (principle of unity) : sensorimotor paradox creates a fixed referent to outside movement of the environment that gives intentional unity to the perception of the surroundings. It becomes a duality "me and the world", a system of difference. It also amplifies the interpersonal projection on the environment, the processes of identification and personification on the localities and objects of the world. Yet, an incertitude remains whether the reality to choose, the plan for interpretation to occupy, whether there is something hidden behind the inertia of the object(s), whether there is a hidden aspect to it or not, the mystics beyond.

3) Principle of discontinuity and triangulation : to break with the anxiety of incertitude about how to (re)act toward the object, an event is created around it that involves the participation of a third party, whose participation takes up the meaning of the event and in the same movement, of the

object. The mind becomes a virtual space for coordinating the memory of such events. The elaboration of language is then authorised for such developments in the creation of new events, pretext to relational meaning both to the world and the others. It happens by process of triangulation and then, the rupture of the initial uniformity of the paradoxical relation to the object, with the irruption of a discontinuity. This three-parted structure is then chained and sequenced in the codified paths of moral and social conducts.

The principle of attention in a fluid environment


Then, we describe the three-parted and triangular work process of the attentive mind to their surrounding objects in general :

1) Uniformity : paradoxical capacity to put oneself in relation to an object and partially exclude the others ;

2) Unity : contextual stability (either environmental or symbolical) checked up by the subject, that gives the frame of interpretation and makes the nature of the object conform with the general expectations to it ;

3) Discontinuity : divergence, association and change of object, even change of expectation toward a context that would have changed.

This merely unconscious chain of mind-working can be applied to object-minding on the physical environment of the person, relational reliability and/or symbolic sequencing and chaining through language or form. It is then a cyclic movement.



During analysis as well as during life, attention is successively focused on 1) the uniformity of the relational bond, 2) the general coherence of the environmental context, and 3) the capacity to divert attention and to connect it to something else.

This is the cellular canvas of the principle of vigilance of the mind in a fluid milieu, which means an environment that is constantly susceptible to change. The whole structure of the mind is summoned, submitted and sollicitated to the task. Therefore, the more resistance the structure proves, the more perturbed would the cycling be.

For example, a disruption in the capacity of the subject to remove attention from a problematic object, to create discontinuity in attention, would be most likely to provoke a raising of physiological entropy and anxiety. An incertitude whether which object to switch on would provoke disarray. As well, the temporary incapacity to verify the validity and the coherence of the context *I* am plunged into would lead to a similar disorientation.

As for the disturbance in the uniformity of the relation to objects (either physical and/or symbolic), we may suggest that part of psychotic state would lean on that. The reason would be the difficulty to clearly identify the object or dissociate from it. Uniformity in fact implies that you partially discriminate yourself from the object, discrimination that is eventually preceded by the unity (identifying of the background context) and discontinuity (interchanging the objects) process.

Yet if the primary bond is unsure, the rest of the structure reveals unsound. There is a difficulty to discriminate the parties taken in the relation to the object that makes the expectation to it unclear, as well as the largely unconscious identification of the third-party included in the symbolic function. This one would be certainly excluded, delayed and displaced.

We would then put forward that this elementary functioning of attention allows the sollicitation of connections between elements in memory made relatively functional, relational or symbolic.

The Mathematics of the Mind Drive

We would also propose a formalised mathematical function for the elementary *mind drive*, from the Insight Drive and Centre of Gravity to the structure proposed. There the function β of the mind's drive :

$$\beta = dt \frac{2 - \vec{\Psi}^2/k}{\vec{\Phi}} \cdot \mu k^{-1}$$

Where dt is the differential infinitesimal time lapse ; $2 - \vec{\Psi}^2/k$ the module (2 - exponential *psychic drive* to symbolic objects over the limit point k that is the *untied point*), tensor to the resistance to sustained effort (the module equals $\frac{1}{\vec{\Phi}}$ when $\vec{\Psi}^2$ equals k ; vector $\vec{\Phi}$ the physical drive ; μk^{-1} coefficient of the mass of the mind structure over the tensor.

The complex $\frac{2 - \vec{\Psi}^2/k}{\vec{\Phi}}$ represents the pressure point, the couple psyche-body that needs to stay in balance. When shut down, only remains $\beta = dt \frac{\mu}{k \cdot \vec{\Phi}}$, that is the inertia of the sensorimotor paradox, represented by the *untied point*.

This function β helps us formalise the description made of the workings and structure of the mind.

Ethical issues

To finish, we would add that the structure described for the topology of the mind would not be even but rather unequal. Not all points have the same weight, that is why it is formalised as a vectorial structure. Symbolical meanings are weight by the mark left on the subject by slight or larger traumas, which are consciously or unconsciously active, or susceptible to be reactivated all along the subject's life.

That is why such a description of the mind's structure should not be taken too lightly. It allows us to create and open a space to support the mind's inspection and introspection. It allows us to think on the mind in a very large sense, to observe its general intrications and movements.

In the work with a concrete subject, a patient, a person's life, it would merely allow us to make analogies. As always, even such an item is a metaphor. Yet it may grant us with a rather complete, or at least coherent vision of how the resistances are intricated with the sensorimotor anchors, the relational experiences and the symbolic extrapolations.

It is not an exact map we are making of the mind, but an allegory. It is then imprecise, highly contextual and above all, something to be observing on a fast but most legitimate personal level.

Hermeneulogy - V - The common, the complex, the imaginary object

[On the complex nature of the perceived object, seen both as real and/or imaginary.]

'Qu'exprime donc le langage, s'il n'exprime pas des pensées ? Il présente ou plutôt il *est* la prise de position du sujet dans le monde de ses significations. Le terme de "monde" n'est pas ici une manière de parler : il veut dire que la vie "mentale" ou culturelle emprunte à la vie naturelle ses structures et que le sujet pensant doit être fondé sur le sujet incarné. Le geste phonétique réalise, pour le sujet parlant et pour ceux qui l'écoutent, une certaine structuration de l'expérience, une certaine modulation de l'existence, exactement comme un comportement de mon corps investit pour moi et pour autrui les objets qui m'entourent d'une certaine signification. [...] Cet acte de transcendance [du corps humain] se rencontre d'abord dans l'acquisition d'un comportement, puis dans la communication muette du geste : c'est par la même puissance que le corps s'ouvre à une conduite nouvelle et la fait comprendre à des témoins extérieurs. Ici et là un système de pouvoirs définis se décentre soudain, se brise et se réorganise sous une loi inconnue du sujet ou du témoin extérieur, et qui se révèle à eux dans ce moment même.' In Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception*, "VI. Le corps comme expression et la parole", Ed. Gallimard, 1945 (2005), p. 235

As we have studied before with the definition of the trauma, there is no relation between individuals through language and its cultural rules if there is no object between them. The knot of their relational contract relies on the possibility to introduce a distance between the bodies and between the souls, that is the moral integrity of the person. There is a capacity to isolate the relation to this object from the rest of the world, that makes the elaboration of this kind of relation possible and sustainable : objects made both alien to us and yet an extension for it.

This, as we introduced the principle of attention in the last article, is the property taken from the principle of *uniformity*. The capacity to create this isolation and to artificially maintain the isolated relation to the object enables the subject to create a distance to it from the context, which is verified and secured by the principle of *unity*. We are not only finding objects in the world, we are creating the world of another kind of objects meant to maintain a closed and uniform relationship with - and then, to combine them up together.

This capacity can be stimulated either by the desire to it or the restraint imposed by the context. There, the role of the traumas in the generation of restraining conditions in the moral topology of the subject turns important. In any case, it creates a tension, which is mainly the fear of losing the thread. We are pushed to be both aware of what is going on outside around us and to be able to still focus on the object of the maintained relations.

The uniformity of these relations allows and involves the unity and stability of the context, which stability allows in its turn the crack, the opening of and to the *discontinuity*. The entropy of uniformity's inertia makes the turn in fact inevitable, unless the ability to breathe properly and drive physiological stability at balance.

Connector and complex object

We would like then to introduce some new objects to the analysis of the subject and mind's workings. First, what we would call the *connector*, that it also the *tensor* described in the structure of the mind (see last article). It keeps the latter up from breaking off the seek for objects that drives

the uniformity to relation. This connector is the physiological and sensorimotor capacity to hold relational drive in order to assign it to the first reliable object of thought.

The mind is in fact always open to new objects (or taken as new) to maintain a relation to, enveloping the motions of uniformity, unity and discontinuity successively and altogether. Then, it can be led to either *real* objects, or *imaginary* objects, in the short or long term. Still needs to be determined is what they are.

The *common object* of relation is a place in the relational structure, that can be either occupied or left vacant. If occupied, it is worked out by the subject(s) involved. If vacant, the subject is always in need for one to connect to and looks for it actively, unless the mind is turned off.

Then the same object (a shoe for example, worn by someone on the metro) is a *complex object*. On the perceptive, relational and symbolic level, it is complex, that means, if we take from Mathematics again and complex numbers, that it can be either real or imaginary ; or somewhere in between. What we need here is to define what would be the real side of the object and what would be then its imaginary side.

The common object of intention can be articulated *in discourse* between the subject and another subject (for instance, I start to comment something on the shoes of the person on the metro with them) : in such a case, the object shows on its *real* and scalar side, that you can divide up between the parties through language-based behaviour. This is the participation of the *other subject* that confirms the reality *for all* of the object that is common to both parties. It establishes the co-woven, contextual, the entangled and intersubjective meaning of the object born by the enactional investment of the subjects.

But it can also be contemplated on its potential interest for all *whom are close* to its influence circumference, the phenomenal environment, yet as an unidentified and discovered object : it is then perceived on its imaginary aspect that is polar, cyclic. The object itself is emitting its own possibilities and its own potential to awaken interest. There is then here a higher degree of incertitude and unpredictability to the object that comes as a side effect of the relational expectation to it. The latter is imprecise, approximate. This is the gap in the identification of the object, that necessarily makes it partial.

The object becomes real then when it is articulated, when it ceases to be defined only by its own inertia ; but when it starts carrying a meaning that the subject can relate through to someone else, to unvail the common interest to it with another subject.

Otherwise, the object is only unacheived, potential, that is imaginary. Provoking only image, the invisible that can only be seen. From imaginary to real, we get from expectation to relation, and we make the object common to the others. Language and its creativity, according to the attention principle we put forward, weave the objects in and with the contextual meaning they are creating as well in a circling movement. We create a world for meaning that is *another world* corresponding to the first one.

For example, the relation maintained to the activity of thinking is connecting attention to the one common and elementary object that stands between me and the flow of thoughts, the limit and possibly untied point that is : the room, the space itself opened in the mind's place for thinking, the distance created from the background of reality. This connector we proposed here as an image introduces the uniform distance from the sollicitations of the surrounding environment. That is necessary to occupy the mind on thinking, to find itself objects to be maintained on.

Then the maintained uniform relation to this opened space *is* in the activity of thinking the very imaginary object that may open in its turn to its weaving in context. The latter context becomes

the 'third-person phenomenon circuit' described by French philosopher Merleau-Ponty in *Phenomenology of perception*⁵². We hear somebody - that is no one - speaking those words in their own fashion, where the style and behaviour of speech, 'the *stand* of the subject in the world of their meanings' is relevant as this place taken by *the* voice inside of a certain social, moral, symbolic and imaginary context.

There the sequences of speech, arrangement of words and sequenced chains of meaning create the elaboration of the discourse, that is a series of moves enveloped in the unity of a teleological intention. The aim is the object, or 'I refer to the word like my hand inclines towards the point on my body that one stings'.⁵³ Which means that the important is the relation I am making to my own seek for a relation - the space, the tension in-between.

When psychoanalyst Darian Leader analyses today the necessity to occupy our hands permanently, it is but only that : the gap, the distance and the *lag* created by this neural distance. This connector which we believe came from the sensorimotor paradox of the hand itself, left us with a room for objects to manipulate that is always still or at least partly vacant.

To Merleau-Ponty, 'we have to admit that "to seize" or "to touch", even for the body, is something else than "to show"'.⁵⁴ If you are pointing out an object, you are opening a space that was imaginary, a potential space for discourse (we don't say through what kind of language), to the capacity to seize the same object together, to create meaning to this object, for the body or for the mind - hopefully for the soul, that is the unity of both and the person beyond the subject.

The loss of objects

What is important then to analysis is what happens when objects are lost, become symbolically forbidden to use and thoughtfully handle. What does happens when the prohibition of key objects in the individuals' inner life, that has to do with trauma and unconscious wounds ?

Actually, the connector is still looking for objects anyway to occupy, so it will take substitutes for those it is forbidden to use. Somehow it will trust the relations the subject is allowed to tend to when expecting what is hidden - even from themselves - in what they can more freely or immediately aim the spotlights on.

The force that is driven by the resistance may produce matter - speech matter, behaviour matter, art matter, concrete matter - more easily but in vain. By contrast, when produced an effort in a resisting milieu, the same force engaged in a more open one would prove apparently easier and lighter. In fact it is not adequate at all. Yet it finds objects that are more easily consumed, without finding plain meaning - maybe an enough, contextual but partial meaning instead.

One of the tasks of psychoanalysis seems then to be drying off the daisy land where gravity is low, and get by the deep waters where the pressure is high. To give effort its real value, force its concrete support.

One can't properly do that without being aware that all that rely on a distance to one's own ability to think. Work on the common object. The imaginary is too potential. The real depends on the other party.

In any situation, to be in the safest place, you would only have to reach to the untied point of your mind - that ultimately is where beauty lies.

⁵² *Op. cit.*, p. 214.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

Hermeneulogy - VI - Structured constellation and the tensor

[Elaboration of the tensor concept in relational and intentional structure.]

'Dès lors, de quoi nous satisfaisons-nous exactement quand le sujet nous dit que les choses sont arrivées à ce point de déclic où il a le sentiment de la vérité ?' In Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire - livre I : Les écrits techniques de Freud*, Ed. Seuil, 1975, "Analyse du discours et analyse du moi", p.80

'The real, or what is perceived as such, says psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, is what resists completely to symbolisation. [...] The structuration of the ego [can be] designated as a defence. This is the most superficial part of identification, but we can reach by this way, a deeper plan, and recognise the situation of the subject in the symbolic order.'⁵⁵ The situation of analysis is a limit one, because the subject is pushed to the limit where they become an object of study for themselves, an object of relation to their own past, present and future.

If the mind is incarnate and the brain mainly a matter of neural connection, it means that nothing really gets out of what we see, what we feel and what we are. It also means that each experience and each relation to other experiences is about connections made between forms emerging in a context. At any level whatsoever, any experience is defined by the plurality of the memories and neural links they engage and relate to. Hence, there is a structure, and this structure is at the same time engaging the multiple aspects of their human life.

We would like here, to finish a first cycle of our presentations, to show another modelling of the structure proposed for the mind's workings. In his first seminary on Freud's technical writings, Lacan evoked another psychoanalyst, Melanie Klein, as to her work with a little boy named Dick.⁵⁶ Then he comments : 'with [Dick], what is not symbolised, is reality. This young subject is wholly in reality, in its pure state, unconstituted. He is wholly in the indifferenciated.'

What is interesting here is that it gets to the three main plans - extracted from Freud's topic and reformulated by Lacan - as to *where* the subject is driving their attention to and *what* part of their experience they are relating to : the real, the symbolic or the imaginary. You might remember that in our last article, we as well defined the particularity of the object to be either real or imaginary.

Because in the object, there is *already* a relation - that we relate to it - otherwise there is no object at all. That is what Lacan aims at when he is commenting the attitude of the boy : 'if, in the human world, objects multiply, develop, with the richness that constitutes their originality [...] Dick lives in a non-human world'. He doesn't speak, because 'his ego hasn't been formed'. The boy sees, but doesn't situate himself in the symbolic world that means *populated* by other humans.

Therefore we talk here about topology for the mind, because reality is doubled by the meaning given to each place, each experience, each object, each *other* person. In that meaning, there is no reality if there is nothing to relate the objects to a close and firm certitude that the others will provide a meaning to them eventually. There is a confidence that somehow eventually the connection with others will suffice to make a whole, a world where *I* am included willingly and with enough sincerity.

That means that a reality cannot be questioned through mere uniform and exclusive relation

⁵⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁵⁶ In Melanie Klein, *The importance of symbol-formation in the development of the ego* (1930).

if the attentive and temporary perceptive bond isn't broken to include, eventually, the intersubjective others - the ones who can respond and share common meaning.

The real, the symbolic, the imaginary

Playing with the real, that is mere sensorimotricity of perception, the objects only have the possibility to awake reactions in the imaginary. Without intermediary relations, there is nothing here but a correspondence sensory image-to-memory image. The intermediary structure in-between is not relating to *what it could be of any use for anybody else*.

We just expect that the object would start relating to us naturally, without even participating that much ourselves but just passively watching it happening - or expecting that it should happen. The subject relates the potentialities of the object to a world made out of an indifferenciaded surroundings, that is an unified world without perspective - the world of the impact, of the meeting of objects without an object and without relations, the world of the trauma.

A perspective means that we should think of a way to go to one point in a certain way. In a strict relation real-to-imaginary, there is no way at all. There is just a world. But a world without a way is no world for us at all. It annuls the possibility of a world for us - so we can go back to our occupations and trust our senses, but offer not more than our sole existence ; no perspective in a shared world that would be planned on the symbolic playground.

Then when the subject relates these potentialities to another subject's point of view, belonging to a structure that is cultural and more vast than the point, because it is a related point *already*, the subject enters reality *with* the object - that is in fact, as an object, a reality meant by the symbolic order. This symbolic order implies that *something was here before*, that means : a myth, of the person, the family, the community, at last - the world.

The subject is born in the web of such a network of meaning, that as well situates them into this world and weighs their acts. Such balance of the value of the acts is being taught since the early childhood through the imprint of the moral environment and its implicit rules - implicit meanings. Then there is a constant circulation between the plans, that makes the unconscious what Lacan called a 'structured constellation', that is as organically intricaded to the sensorimotor that it is written and coded in every move one takes on the time they have to live.

Perception of time and space depends on how much you borrow from your actions and how much is taken as a debt to the time you borrow from others - eventually, society's time. You are always tied up to that network of meaning, and this can give value to what you are doing, as it can plunge any of your moves in anxiety.

Such an anxiety is told to be the signal of the mode of identification corresponding to each objectal relation, according to Lacan. Which means no other thing than the tension arising from the uniformity of the primordial relation to the object. Because it puts everything else on hold, even the body, and most especially the world around and its sollicitations.

One should open to something or someone else - or if they are stuck in the *real*, they would be going on as far as a silent road would go. Except that a road that is marked on the ground isn't necessarily a way, meaning that you would not only expect it to go somewhere, but that you would intend to go somewhere with it.

Yet the base of the structure of the mind's working is that you *go*, the sensorimotricity of it and at last, the space opened to seize a mean to go somewhere. As to the capacity to orientate oneself and to favour one way more than another, as a function of where it might guide them, it is mainly depending on the symbolic.

The top and the base


To this structured constellation, the *real* is a wide-open gap. And this gap is what we called the tensor or the connector, that is the base of the structure, the measure of the human way of having such a thing as a mind.

We would describe then an inverted cone with a truncated top that has become the base of the reversed structure. The base is, for us, the tensor of the structure, the connector, the space and room opened, blind from any symbolic relations, detached from any other influence, the most irreducible part of the individual's psyche : the neural *lag* that permits the rest of it - the distention of the responses that means a distention in time and the disruption of its continuity.

This is the base of the sensorimotor paradox that makes possible the chaining of the three principles of attention-to-objects theory : uniformity, unity and discontinuity. This sensorimotor paradox enables the individuals to artificially recreate those moves without depending on chance with their surrounding environment. It enables them to create this space, this imaginary scene that would be able later to open to other participants.

The rest of the spectrum of the subject's mind is then open to the structure of those relations that make the world meaningful for more than one - but potentially for all. The top of this embodied structure represents the limit one always finds when they confront themselves to others, to the difficulty of one task or to their own limitations.

Anyhow, it tames the expansion of the structure and gives it a proper room to value their own actions.



The quality of the structure is then not that much on the quantities of marking points, of experiences, memories and more generally, of traumatic imprints, but on the quality of these relations. A variety of tying points would allow more resilience of the subject to shock on the condition that they should be related between them on to the deepest level.

Psychoanalysis is then not much about telling the past, as to reveal how much the more recent outcomes of the subject are connected deep down to more profound motivations. The defence of the subject may be here, but not all parts of the structure defend the same way, not at nor for the same time. One later investment always pulls roots from a lower ground.

As well, the subject's unconscious has already started defending themselves at a time of their life when they surely did not know quite well that they were defending themselves from something *that* precise. It was then just only discovered, hence the shock. Most of the time, even in a deep traumatic event suffered by the person, like child rape, the person attacking is not themselves anymore, and the child doesn't have to defend themselves from the other person as they are defending themselves from collapsing and failing on the way to an escape - any escape.

The meaning takes place on a way *out* of the situation where their body is taken and used. Therefore later, the other is often not as much the problem as they barely exist anymore, because what they did didn't have a shared meaning. Somehow, when you cannot defend yourself and you know it, you would just erase your own part of the self that was present at that moment in life. You were just *not there*, not related, not included as a person, but merely as an alien body. Otherwise, how could one forget about it, and how could it be so difficult to come back again from that ?

Somehow, connections are missing, and even upper parts of the structure cannot relate to it, use it as a (re)source - but as a modified version of what happened that means - of the story, of the way out of the current world, of the mythical one ruled by a fragmented symbolic order.

The object *c* of trauma

The fact that the symbolic order is fragmented by the trauma - any trauma - is explainable because any mark blurs the parties involved into the structure of the wound. As we saw it, in the trauma, we have : $a + b = c$. Eventually, only *a* or *b* is active in the impact of the trauma. They would even be successively or simultaneously both in a reciprocal way. Both are wounded, should they be rather unequally ; but subjectively, *I* am wounded by the other, even if the other is also wounded by the same action of hurting *me*.

Nevertheless, in the end, what would only remain for life is the result, the little *c*. That is why if Jacques Lacan formalised the object *a* as the elementary object of desire, we should never forget that for one object *a* there is a land where its imprint crashes - like an asteroid - that is *b*, and that eventually from both of them would only remain a mark that is *c*.

From this triadic structure, we get a larger one that means that *c* would cristallise in *C*, that should be what we called a *relay point*. These relay points gather, like a gravity field, all the remains of the previous identities, those *a* and *b* that crashed together into a new form of being, let us introduce : the inert trauma.

Inert because it has its force of inertia, and that this force of inertia drives the whole structure. It is a resistance if the subject has withdrawn from it, leaving it as a forbidden land. It is a more positive value when it is recognised and then, when it becomes the root for a constructed and structured desire or refusal of a reality meant to be shared with others - properly, a moral value, that engages the whole person.

The self is then organised and more resilient, not because they don't leave blank spots in the way they look toward their own structured mind, but because they would allow a certain degree of approximation in the way they should hold grip over it. In a way, they are looking above it and cannot see all the detail of what they are spending so much time and energy on forgetting.

The good in moving forward with a clear mind is that they are confident enough of the

structure so that they won't bother asking themselves if there is any point in having a structure that wouldn't become abstract. Any structure tends to abstract from the contingency of a blind world. They would rather be blind and let the world see what they chose to be.

Eventually, it is to be trusted, it would make perfect sense to it anyway, and it would all in the end then be alright.

Hermeneulogy - VII - Holes in the stream

[Conclusion and opening to micro-decision sequencing in the intentional and relational process.]

'Je crois que c'est essentiellement la parole réduite à son trognon. Ce n'est ni lui, ni quelqu'un d'autre. Il est évidemment *Le loup* ! pour autant qu'il dit cette parole-là. Mais *Le loup* ! c'est n'importe quoi en tant que ça peut être nommé. Vous voyez là l'état nodal de la parole. Le moi est ici complètement chaotique, la parole arrêtée. Mais c'est à partir de *Le loup* ! qu'il pourra prendre sa place et se construire.'

'Nous avons été amenés à souligner cette face de la résistance qui se situe au niveau même de l'émission de la parole. La parole peut exprimer l'être du sujet, mais, jusqu'à un certain point, elle n'y parvient pas. [...] La parole pleine est celle qui vise, qui forme la vérité telle qu'elle s'établit dans la reconnaissance de l'un par l'autre. La parole pleine est parole qui fait acte. Un des sujets se trouve, après, autre qu'il n'était avant. [...] Dès ce point posé, vous avez déjà pu vous en apercevoir, beaucoup de choses s'orientent et s'éclairent, mais beaucoup de paradoxes et de contradictions apparaissent. Le mérite de cette conception est justement de faire apparaître ces paradoxes et ces contradictions, qui ne sont pas pour autant des opacités et des obscurcissements. C'est souvent, au contraire, ce qui apparaît harmonieux et compréhensible qui recèle quelque opacité. Et c'est inversement dans l'antinomie, dans la béance, dans la difficulté, que repose notre méthode, et, j'espère, notre progrès aussi.' In Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire - I : Les écrits techniques de Freud*, Ed. Seuil, coll. Champ Freudien, 1975, pp. 121-126.

Speech is awkward. Anytime one would try to pronounce a speech would find themselves hesitating as to the place taken by the speech. Is it that I am speaking to inform the others of an object ? Or is it that I want to express that I am the object that speaks and presents a quality of being speaking to the others, but more surely for myself ?

The question was posed by psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. He answered by saying that what was spoken could either concern the subjects involved in the exchange of words, in a certain intersubjective context ; or it could be about an object that is external to them. The first situation would affect the subjects directly in their being, the second would affect their perception of their world.

In any way, the question placed at the centre is : what is the subject, and what is the object ? The word that names the reality of the object is here in the middle ; and it says also that there is a subject speaking, that can be the subject behind the subject, the one hidden, the one that is the shadow of the first seen. If I say 'I am speaking', in fact, the one that means is behind the voice that speaks, that says the word : *I*.

The subject behind the word

The theme that we are going to tackle now is perhaps the most delicate amongst those we have tackled so far, because it goes beyond theory as language goes beyond the subject. Observing the case of Melanie Klein's little boy named Dick and Rosine Lefort's other boy named Robert⁵⁷, Lacan introduced the idea that those children were living in a sheer *real*. That means with no symbolic mediation, no access to the objects of the symbolic that involve the capacity to make them

⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 105-122.

a function of speech, a distance to plain reality.

For the little Robert, the subject and the object merged in the few words he could bear. Speaking was only diverting attention from the subject that he was. When we speak, we try to include ourselves in the conditions of speech to speak to another and for all the parties, including ourselves by this way. Here, we can suppose that the failure of the conditions for speech made unidentifiable the fact that the word *I* would ever leave the subject off.

The idea suggested by Lacan of the perception and acceptance - hardly acquired by the boy - of the separation of the content and the container, of the *thing* and the tool, proves accurate. The boy expresses himself by exclaiming *The wolf!* in any occasion words find a way out to reality. Yes, the imaginary and reality confront themselves with the blocking point : the subject lives with unmediated, undistanced real because the subject is living themselves as an imaginary subject in an imaginary body.

The stage of the mirror, in lacanian theory, means that not only I see myself entirely in the mirror but that someone else is attesting that *I* see my *self* in the mirror, commenting the meeting. The discourse is mediating the conditions of reality, because everybody else is acting as talking people, and those talks make some sense thanks to their correspondence to a certain reality that is made coordinate.

Yet here, Lacan says of Robert's words that it is truncated, because the subject is withdrawn. Words are *before* him. They fail in relating him to common conditions with the others. They are properly idiosyncratic before they can bear common knowledge and meaning. Words, even few words like *The wolf!*, are *ahead of him*, meaning that something is *there* that I cannot see, but who knows what all this means for him ?

The distance is produced with something that is not seen, but as a signal. *I exist* because the signal of *The wolf!* being *there* exists. I show, in fact I let it out. Yet by doing this, I only stay behind the signal, and fail speaking for myself, or for something else than my *self*. It only makes sense for it that I speak.

We can suppose that Robert's world was a world of continuum, where it was impossible not to stay awake. Because his words could not go back to him after being taken. The other cannot say : 'I understand.' That is why eventually, the ritual of his own milk bathing and baptism, naming himself *Robert*, is so moving to read. So far, words had not gotten off the imaginary place of the body, unable to express but a signal of the boy's own existence inside of it. Then he could find a way out of it and eventually, get back to it.

To choose to be in or out, you need to move between two separate places : beyond or behind the word. Robert could just not get out beyond them.

Had anybody else acted out of language, out of speech rules, savage and wild, he could have managed the impact. But how to confront speaking and still people, and make it half between both sides, to let room for a mediating object to be common to, that would also be including you ?

There was just no room in-between, and the wolf had already entered the place of the subject.

The *me* paradox

As quoting Lacan in the introduction, there is something opaque in a harmonious object. A crack in its unity would allow us to enter, to seek for more objects inside of it, to eat the fruit's flesh to another bone. Yet it is round, and that is why a plain object can only be a mediating object.

In our previous work, we introduced one irreducible object that we called the *tensor* or the connector. In fact, the tensor is the subject behind the word that we were talking about. In our theory of the three paradoxes, it relates to the paradox of the word *me*, that cannot reach its object completely.

When I say 'me', I realise that I haven't moved an inch physically. It hasn't projected me outside of myself. I have kept stuck in my own skin, so to speak. It has been made *for the others*. And I am changed because of that. Saying *me*, talking about the subject that I am, trapped behind the words, to another subject, is changing me because it is pulling on the *me* at the root of the structure, it is working on it.

When Robert fails to say that *he is too*, a 'me', he only expresses that he doesn't want to leave the *me* that is : am I going to *be* me outside of it ? Will I have to play not behind the word that names me but beyond it, on the other side of it, where the word projects me ? His physical moves, his behaviour is erratic, chaotic and discoordinate because moving in a rectilinear and binary way is obeying by a rule that is patterned, sequenced, recognisable and predictable.

Do you know where I am, says Robert ? *I am hidden in the forest, like the wolf, and it is unlikely that you would ever find me*. Erratic moves create signal, but a confused one. Saying *The wolf !* is only specifying that there is still a subject, there is still a *Robert* somewhere, but that he is unseen. Unseen, but not invisible. Only the others only see the alien part of him, the one that is shattered in misunderstanding.

Who is Robert, asks Robert ? Who is he, indeed ? He is a response to the super-ego '*Robert, obey*' ; he is a *no-Robert*. There is no Robert. To say that there is one would be accepting that the word would unvail the presence and the visibility of this *one* - one time, only once, mortal. When I say 'me', I unvail that during all this time, there was somebody listening on the back of my head, that is the back of the mirror, and the back of language.

Sinking in the blink

This opaque screen on the back of the mind is what the tensor means. It is a hole in the stream. A black hole. It is the point that language cannot reach, the paradox, the sensorimotor gap opened by the hand.

Recent studies in Neurosciences, led by Tamami Nakano of Osaka University, focused quite wisely on the resetting role of blinking in the attention effort.⁵⁸ We might extend the concept of attentional blinking to intentional blinking, because it seems that it also breaks the continuity of a possibility for action. If the blinking marks the switch of object for attention, it also means that the world is different, that I may act toward it differently. It would be polarised differently because I intend to enact another possibility toward another object.

This *other object* is driving the polarity of the contextual meaning according to other concerns. This is a different play for another world of meaning and possibilities. Of course, there is a larger world, a larger context that is still in course, but on another scale, the scale of micro-decision, of the sequencing of thought and sensorimotor organisation, the colours, the situation where I am placed has changed.

Thoughts are then organised in moves, in micro-acts (re)creating a certain situation, a certain scene, with something very precise, whether small, at stake. I will try to convince different people. I

⁵⁸ In Tamami Nakano, Makoto Kato, Yusuke Morito, Seishi Itoi, and Shigeru Kitazawa, Blink-related momentary activation of the default mode network while viewing videos, PNAS published ahead of print December 24, 2012, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1214804110>

will, each time, recreate a different scene. I am still here, but it is all retried each time I blink my eyes. The world ends and I will end with it ; then reborn.

That is where the hand paradox proves efficient : while I am gazing my hand, I can hardly blink my eyes and then, I prevent identity from changing on a sequenced model. I don't allow myself to die and to come to another life again. If I could do that, the world wouldn't have to change, because I would rediscover a new kind of world, orientated differently each time I would open my eyes again. But if I keep my eyes wide open on *that thing* that doesn't move and keeps me still, what of the world outside ? It has all the chances to be reborn, I have only one.

Exactly like Robert, who does only have one chance to survive his appearing beyond the word that would be naming him definitely.

As well, blocked by my own hand, there is only one way out : getting back to what is beyond it. Yet it supposes that I would be looking for objects, otherwise what would it be good for ? The hand paradox is a large hole in the stream of the perception of the real. It indicates that some things can block and hinder the real and put me behind it. If I can be *behind the real*, it means that it can swallow *me*. It can annihilate me. So I have to swallow it back first. Therefore I am looking for objects, because this is a signal that I am still alive in fact, that the monster behind the hand won't or hasn't eaten and swallowed me up yet.

There is a *wolf* because there is a possibility that I cannot see or hear *something*. The paradox of the hand creates a *non*-object, an incapacity to be projected beyond, that is intensely anxiety-provoking. I *cannot* relate to this object and it is fearsome because it is annulling *me*. And while it is annulling me, the world gets bigger than me only because I close all the possibilities down. The world is uniformised and unified to an extreme and limit point where it reaches a nothingness : my body becomes infinitely useless and the world then, meaningless, erratic, strange and dangerous - unpredictable.

The common object in analysis

That leads us to the object in analysis, the common object in the middle, the round and opaque one. There cannot be an impact between the two parties in analysis, that is why it is complicated that Freud should call the transfer love. Otherwise the subject falls in the holes of discourse, the blank spots where the mediating object falls. That means that there *is* a subject on the condition that there also is an object they can go round *in spite* of the presence of another one, another subject - Donald Winnicott's *capacity to be alone* with somebody else.

Let us figure the common object of analysis as a floating sphere between the two subjects, a *couple* in the sense of Mechanic Physics. Like suspended in a magnetic field, it is fluidly standing at an equal distance from the two parties. It is moved by a force pushing on both subjects. Then if one of them moves forward to the other beyond this distance, the object will move accordingly. If the other one doesn't in his turn bend backward, the sphere and the other subject would derail from the bond and create the impact.

That is love, the meeting, or death, a wound, but this happens only once, and then you cannot exchange it, only pass and get over it. It is very important that the attempt of either subject to get directly to the other one always finds at an equal distance the object of the mediation, the common object of relation. Otherwise, one would only find the real, that cannot be exchanged nor replaced, that only comes once.

That is why it is important to consider one thing that is : the *me*, the hidden presence that is behind language, behind the word that expresses it, in the hand paradox and the isolated uniform

relation, does only come once, and that is why the rest is extended. Once the subject has realised their mortality, they would either try to protect it - *The wolf !* - or ask around them whether *they* have survived it or not. If the others have survived my own possible death, that is alright, it must not be imminent. Otherwise, how could I leave the place where I am sure I would not disappear, stay close to myself ?

The only way I can make sure that what happens only once would stay unchanged, is to split it, to make it a cell, and repeat it : to make it round, something *I* can go round - but not common to the others - imaginary. As it is only between me and the keeping of myself then, I cannot escape the convergence of this imaginary and the body at the same place.

The wolf ! The wolf ! Do you see it ? But one knows that there is no wolf, that it is pointless, but an event. Something in the unchanging of reality creates a slight movement, just a little variation. In fact, *The wolf !* is a way to point out that what should have happened once happened plenty of times, that it is pointless to see it as an extraordinary event. *The wolf !* is all ordinary, all unity. What is unordinary, is that the body does only come once in the conscious. Once I am out of it, it is finished, abolished, over. The reality of the body strikes like an impact.

This is why the real, the tensor, the room for objects that *is* without objects, that stands in the absence of objects and passing, in the absence of subject, in the annihilation of a subject by the most extreme uniformity of relation - hand paradox again -, is the repetition of those holes in the stream of conscious, these sharp moments of loss that make it a fragmented one - yet with the unity of what happens once and for all.

Language, in every blink of the eyes, is enacting the repetition of those *once* until there are no *once* left to play. What I give to the others, is my participation to its extension, that it would last a bit longer.

When one doesn't believe that it could last, they would have to go savage and wild again, free from moral restraint, crashing against society's wall to impact. Otherwise they would go round themselves, and nurrish their ego with their own matter until there is none left. In the end, it is all woven in the acts, that are contextual - and the context catches up with us eventually.

The important in analysis is to keep close to the object that is unnoticed, and always bring back the attention to its well being in silence. Like the reality of the *me*, it is unapproachable.

All you have to do then and in doubt, is to make peace with it.

Hermeneulogy - VIII - First conclusion : the capacity to close the objects

The three principles of relational attention to objects introduced the elements for a key ability in the human species and the structures of language : the capacity to close the objects. As soon as a relation is made, it is first open and imaginary ; but to articulate them with others, we cannot but close them and reduce them momentarily to what they are useful for at this instant that is - a function.

The power of the metaphor, we saw it, is to create a multiple meaning that is left open. This open potentiality for meaning and connection to a structured sentence is representative of the imaginary relationship with objects. Yet there is no connection certain, and none prevails in metaphor. The possibility that there are several creates a world of the metaphorical object, that only leaves us with our own arbitrary decision.

The contextual approach gives us a territory, and metaphorical objects are its objects - but *not yet* related to a third-party meaning, not yet bond to the others, but still potentially individual, personal and untied. It is ours to close the object that is the poem in every object and living thing that is not closed by itself - but only for a moment that is the decision, the definition of *that* real moment in which contextual meaning is required for action. We move on by determining the limits of the objects we are relating to, that allow us to march from one to another without damaging them - but symbolically if it happens.

Language is not made of closed meanings that would be the words. But open meaningful sequences that are the words in context, that accept to be closed *to a certain meaning*, to grant us with a service, is properly language.

We should never forget that language is offered to us. It is not a due thing. It comes with our life and the life of others. It is not something that we should hold for granted. It is something that has been offered to us *by* the others, and first by the closest to us, and that through History and the moving architectonic ruptures and bindings of cultural territories made of actual people.

Language is not anonymous, but only when it decides to help us with our words. It is charged and carries much more than us. Then it is ours to make the bond that gives the meaning. And thus it is our responsibility to respect it, and to carry it to a better life.

Index : summary of the main notions

- Three paradoxes theory : theory of anthropogenesis stating that the development of bipedal stand and the increasing motor autonomy of the hands produced a sensorimotor paradox, as the hand(s) cannot be the object of intention *and* the mean to grasp itself at the same time. This paradox produces a *lag* in neural response (concept taken from neurobiologist Gerald M. Edelman) and opens to a different kind of relation to objects. The theory relates it to two other paradoxes that are the paradox of the pronunciation of the word *me*, that cannot fully reach its object because it is intersubjective ; and the paradox connected to the effort required to stop the stream of conscious, the stream of thought. For the latter, we introduce the concept of the *tensor* in the Hermeneulogy section. The theory also connects these paradoxes deeply to the structure of morals as the resistances produced are woven in an intersubjective network of meaning, social and cultural context.
- Network of meaning and heterogenous spaces : we strongly believe that the heterogenous character of social and moral spaces create different perspective and possibilities for action that are connected to the moral restrictions or easing factors pushed on the individuals by the presence of others. It appears then important to sanctuarise those spaces in order to allow them to make choices in relation to common objects with others that are progressive. It allows the mind to work on the intermediary spaces proper for each symbolic perspective to enact in an idiosyncratic way.
- Unbreakable objects : one of the first things that is taught to the individuals' since childhood is the difference between the objects that they are allowed to manipulate and even break (some of their toys, for example), and those that they are barely allowed to touch, that they *must not* break, that belong to the others, to the adults. We may suggest that it starts with the breast when the child is not allowed to suck it anymore. It introduces the notion of moral debt, and infests the world of objects, forcibly as well in the infrastructures of the urban world.
- The alien part of the body : as the hand paradox introduces a distance from the individual's own action on the world, it inevitably makes the agent of intention in the body alien. The faculty to make their own body symbolically alien to them is the first step in making objects in the world substitutes for them. Hence, symbolic objects.
- The metaphorical method : the intrication between the body, the symbolic and the network of meaning reinforced by discourse allows us to consider any construction of language for interpretation as an approximation and by this way, as a metaphor of something else, our contextual approach to the world, that is approximate as well. In this breach is born the discipline we have been elaborating, Hermeneulogy.
- The tensor, the seize-wish, the structure of the mind and the untied point : we consider that the body and its events only come once. Therefore there is a part of the subject that is irreducible, Winnicott's non-communicable part of the self, and yet kept on hold because of the paradoxical structure of the mind. That is why we elaborated the concept of the *tensor*, that is the ultimate withdrawable corner of the self, turning against its own constant seeking for objects : repetition, connected to the other concept of *seize-wish* correlating to the activity of the hands, inspected by psychoanalyst Darian Leader. Hence this is the root of the symbolic structure of the mind. This root can be artificially separated from the structure through the representation of the *untied point*, the inertia of the structure.

- Redefinition of the trauma and the common object : we redefined the trauma as being an elementary structure different from the shock that created them. There can be large traumas but also *slight traumas*, that are every sensory meetings that leave a mark on the subject. The structure of the mind is organised from those impacts (that can be pleasurable), creating a response to it from the subject. Then we extend psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's elaboration of the object *a* of desire by stating that in the trauma that creates the object, there is an active object *a* crashing on a passive object *b* (and reciprocally), from which unmediated impact there would only remain the result on the subject that would be an object *c*. It implies that an analytical relation between two subjects must necessarily include an intermediary object that would be the *common object* of relation, that is convex and would be at an equal distance from it to the subjects. This third object allows the subjects to work together without harming each other. Trauma is disinvested of its negative influence to become a more general feature, a driving force charged with different weights on the subject's moral structure - thus its organising force.
- Causal associative chains and scalar radiation stop : conceptual instruments have been developed in this first phase of hermeneutological theory to analyse the dialectical structure of intention and relational tying. Language's structure is perceived as scalar because it is working in sequences. To be focusing on two objects in time simultaneously for instance, the mind's intention has to alternate and intercalate the moments of attention on the one or the other object (for example reading and listening to a song at the same time), to interlace them. Memory works coordinately between them. It gets an intricate notion of how the sequencing of meaning through language is connected to the sensorimotor simulation of the sequencing of perception : time and space are relative to the way heterogeneous spaces and activities are intertwined, and to the style in which the individual intertwines them - hence, the personality of the subject. Then, affective bonds are created between meanings as the most intimate part of the subject is involved in their creation. Here, the consideration of the notion of trauma as we presented it is central : all perception that leaves a mark on the subject is tied to their emotional and affective comprehension of meaning. It is then a question of the distance created between the objects of the world, their proper room taken, weighted by their moral influence of restriction or stimulation on the subject.
- The Three Principles of Structural Anthropogenesis and the complex object : there are three principles pertaining to the elaboration of the relation to objects in the human mind in our theory, presented first in *The most probable case* anthropogenic narrative. They are the principle of the *uniformity* of the relation ; of the *unity* and stability of the context making the relation possible ; and of the *discontinuity* created in the opening of the relation to a Third Party. The symbolic object of psychoanalysis is then described as being a complex object, because as long as the relation to it hasn't been made discontinuous, the object cannot enter the symbolic reality of the common objects, possibly interlaced with others. On the contrary, it gets stuck as an imaginary object, that is an object of image, of direct and unmediated impact, of tension to contact, of trauma. To be part of reality, as the body has been stopped in his sensorimotor regular behaviour by the hand paradox, it has to be woven in the doubled world of the common, shared and intersubjective reality of the symbolic.

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